

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of the literature review will be to establish the importance of Jewish and Christian relations and demonstrate lack of research in this discipline. In my search of the literature I discovered seven qualitative articles examining Jewish Christian relations and one study addressing Jewish Christian dialogue. Additionally, I discovered three quantitative studies concerning Jewish Christian relations. The literature review will be delimited primarily to ethical considerations from an academic, Jewish and Christian perspective.

The paper will address Jewish-Christian relations in light of the Holocaust (Shoah), Christian response to Holocaust (including Anti-Semitism, historical and contemporary positions), Jewish-Christian dialogue, humane orientation (from GLOBE Study), altruism, reconciliation, and liminal space.

Purpose and Organization

How have Christians responded to the Shoah during and following World War II? I am considering this question generally; however my research topic embraces the question: How have Christians and Jews responded to the work of The Matzevah Foundation (TMF)? Due to the long-standing tension and the gulf that separates Jew and Christian, a complex relationship exists between these two groups. My research centers on a means of enriching and developing dialogue that could possibly lead to reconciliation. I believe that Jews and Christians can come to terms with the past pain brought about by the Shoah by dealing with its evil through “loving acts.” Scott Peck argues that “loving acts can overcome evil” (as cited in, Johnson, 2012, p. 127).

Forgiveness may emerge leading to dialogue and possibly reconciliation. My dissertation will explore mercy as the language of dialogue and the organization that I lead, TMF will illustrate that dialogue.

The intent of the literature review is to establish the importance of Jewish and Christian relations including the continuum of Jewish-Christian dialogue and to demonstrate the lack of research in these disciplines. The literature review will be delimited to ethical considerations from an academic, Jewish and Christian perspective; however, it will deliberate several key theological considerations and implications as they relate to ethical behavior. The paper will consider the implications of Micah 6:8 as a moral standard or construct for humanity and within this framework contemplate analogous academic concepts including humane orientation (from the GLOBE Study), altruism and several key ethical theories. Furthermore, the literature review will address Jewish-Christian relations in light of the Shoah (Holocaust), the Christian response to Shoah (including Anti-Semitism, historical and contemporary positions), Jewish-Christian dialogue, reconciliation, forgiveness and liminal space.

The Construction

It is my conviction that life on this planet has meaning and purpose. Jewish and Christian traditions embrace the belief that G-d created humanity and placed men and women on this planet. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin (2009) connects this understanding with the commandment to “love our neighbor” due to the fact that “*all* human beings are created by God” and for this reason human beings are interrelated as “one extended family” (p. 10). From the Talmud we read one of the questions the rabbis raised: “Why, when the world was created, did God create just one man and one woman?” Racelle Weiman (2008), in her article cites their answer: “So that humankind understands that we all come from a single union, to teach us that we are all sisters

and brothers, and that no one is greater than any other” (p. 91). The Tanakh (Hebrew Bible or Old Testament) asks this question similarly in Malachi 2:10: “Have we not all one Father? Did not one God create us?” On this unique sphere – this globe, we live as human beings in community, in a relationship with G-d and each other. For this reason Weiman determines that we share a “common lineage,” in which each man and woman “is created in the divine image” and is an acknowledgment of the fact that “God's presence is illuminated in each individual” (p. 91). G-d reveals his character in every human being; therefore every man and woman is equal and worthy of dignity and for this reason we should treat each other as if we matter and as if we love one another.

Nevertheless, such an idealistic view is rejected, not embraced or practiced. We live in a broken world, one filled with war and conflict, pain and despair. Clearly this is evident especially in the aftermath of some of the most heinous crimes humanity has perpetrated against itself in so called “ethnic cleansings” or genocides such as the Shoah. In this world men and women live in communities at odds with each other oftentimes divided deeply by embedded value and cultural differences, practices and beliefs. Does a common moral ground exist by which people may live their lives, understand each other, interrelate and resolve differences, so that they might live life with each other in peace? Weiman once more speaks to us encouraging us to fill “the void between and among us” with “the essential ingredient of hope” (Weiman, 2008, p. 89). Hope is not something fleeting or wishful thinking. It is an expectation, a confidence of better things to come. Since humanity lives life on this planet corporately, I believe embedded within us are a common set of moral values – literally a moral compass and guidance system, which assists us determine right from wrong in concert with determining appropriate actions or right behaviors. As will be demonstrated, the academic literature supports such a possibility; although among

researchers, there are disagreements and arguments as to its source or origins, it is clear that many moral values are shared across cultures throughout the world.

My theorem is that evil and hatred drive people apart, while kindness and love bind people together. Since human beings do not live in a vacuum but are interrelated, love or concern for others is a fundamental expression of humanity. University of Hawaii professor Dr. Victor Stenger (2006) is one who rejects the notion that moral values can only originate from G-d. He affirms that even across diverse cultures and beliefs humanity agrees “on a common set of moral standards;” even though differences are evident, he concludes that “universal norms seem to exist” (p. 2). Dr. Thom Wolf (2010b) in his article regarding change in progress-prone and progress-resistant cultures, echoes Stenger’s conclusion and points to the work of University of California anthropologist, Elvin Hatch, who delineated the concept of the “ubiquity of moral evaluation of behaviour” that exists across borders in global cultures (as cited in, Wolf, 2010b, p. 9). Wolf views Hatch’s concept as “the core moral sense of humane human behavior” (p. 9). Moreover, Wolf employs Hatch’s four dimensions regarding change across cultures as a basis for constructing his template of social change and development. Two of Wolf’s conclusions regarding Hatch’s (as cited in, Wolf, 2010b, p. 9) dimensions are valuable with regards to establishing a common moral standard. Wolf concludes (p. 9):

1. There is a humanistic standard, a generally approved set of normative human principles for life and societal flourishing. These normative principles yield a, “humanistic standard” for humane conduct: health not illness, prosperity not poverty, peace not conflict, dignity not disrespect, truthfulness not deceit, integrity not corruption.
2. There is considerable agreement on the core dimensions of a moral society. There is, Hatch points out, a “considerable portion” of humanity which agrees to this basic moral standard.

Beyond the common moral core, Wolf (2010b) introduces the concept of the “J-shaped spiritual capital” (p. 8), which is an idea drawn from the work of Theodore Malloch, a professor at Yale University. Wolf states (p. 8):

[Malloch] argues that historically, the spiritual capital of Protestant business persons focuses on the three virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The Jesus-shaped *worshipview*, says Malloch, yields a worldview triad of leadership discipline (faith), social compassion (charity), and persevering justice (hope).

Instead of a Wolf’s worldview triad of faith, charity, and hope, I see mirrored in these values, an ethical or moral template consisting of justice, mercy and humility. Although some would question the source of these values, I believe that these values are transcendent and universal. The Jewish prophet Micah conveys G-d’s requirements for moral life – how life should be lived on this planet. In Micah 6:8, we discover: “He has showed you, O man, what is good. And what does the LORD require of you? To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God.” Therefore I believe that the moral construction for life is to act justly/*justice*, to love mercy/*charity* and to walk humbly with God/*faithfulness*. From Matthew 23:23, we see how Jesus Christ echoes this moral understanding in his interpretation of what he describes as by living in this manner we may focus upon “the more important matters of the Law.”

Micah 6:8: What G-d Requires

As stated and by what will be demonstrated in this review, I postulate that Micah 6:8 is the moral construction for life. This construct is to act justly, love mercy and walk humbly; it is a means by which we may live morally and be ethical in our dealings with each other. I think that this moral construct provides the critical element for us in our journey of understanding and developing an ethical or moral standard for our lives. Ethics is not something for theoretical or abstract living, but should provide principles concerning our behavior, what we actually do. I am

certain that Micah 6:8 declares what G-d requires of us: My premise is that we are to act justly – do what is right no matter what; however, our ethic should be transformed by what we believe, by our worship and adoration of G-d, especially by how we live our lives in relationship to others. In Jeremiah 7:5-7 we see the prophetic interpretation and application of the moral principles found in Micah 6:8 as Jeremiah writes:

If you really change your ways and your actions and deal with each other justly, if you do not oppress the alien, the fatherless or the widow and do not shed innocent blood in this place, and if you do not follow other gods to your own harm, then I will let you live in this place, in the land I gave your forefathers for ever and ever.

We may conclude that the moral principles delineated above are:

1. Do not live as you are; change your ways and actions and deal with each other justly.
2. Do not oppress the weak or shed innocent blood; show mercy, care/love for others.
3. Do not follow other gods; let your walk be faithful to the One True G-d.

Micah 6:8: A Threefold Pattern for Morality

When considering the scope and range of issues contained in the Bible, this simple verse found in Micah 6:8 has been a source of inspiration to the world for nearly 3,000 years and accordingly “many people regard this verse as a high point in religious and moral thought” (Hyman, 2005, p. 157). Andersen and Freedman (2000) consider Micah 6:8 to be “rightly celebrated as the supreme definition of ethical religion” (as cited in, Hyman, 2005, p. 157). Hyman also advances the notion in his article that this verse contains “what should be the foundation of human behavior” (p. 164). Wolf (2010a) on the other hand categorically argues that this verse provides the “moral standard for humanity” (p. 14).

Hyman (2005) states that the rabbis, who wrote the Talmud, determined that Micah 6:8 “by virtue of its three principles of doing justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God,” captured the essence of the 613 commandments in the *Halakhah* (p. 157). Wolf (2010a) traces the

etymology of the Hebrew word, *halakhah* (also transliterated as *halakah* and *halakoth*) stating that it originates from the Hebrew root, *halakot* means “ways of the oral tradition” and is associated with the word *halak*, which describes “how one should walk;” furthermore, Wolf explains that the purpose of the *halakhah* “was to define Jewish identity in contrast to the surrounding nations” (p. 32). The core of Micah 6:8 is based on a pattern of a simple string of only three verbs emphasizing “*doing, loving, and walking* – connected to three basic moral values – *justice, mercy, and humility*,” which according to Hyman (2005) “make it comprehensible and easy to remember” (p. 164). He concludes:

The three verbs indicate deliberate human actions and are different from verbs that represent involuntary actions such as breathing, crying, and sneezing. The series of three pairs of ‘a verb tied to a moral value’ creates an appealing poetic rhythm. Together, they constitute a series that is a moral guideline for behavior among humans; a goal worth striving for (p. 164).

In his dissertation, Wolf (2010a) traces the development and transmission of this pattern of teaching founded upon the core values of Micah 6:8, which he terms as “threefold prophetic moral standard for humanity” (p. 119). Based on the work of Seeberg (1903), Carrington (1940) and Bultman (1942/1995) he postulates that the early Christian Church received such a pattern from its Jewish roots and elaborates further on this pattern:

The beginning place to look into the pattern of teaching of the primitive church for Carrington (1940) is the spiritual instruction/*torah* among the Jews, an instruction connected not with theological or speculative knowledge, but with the Law of God/*torah*, with the wisdom/*hokmah* that comes from fearing the Lord, the God Most High, and with commendable behavior or walking/*halakhah* (p. 3). *Torah* was oral, traditional, and semi-ritual. Its teachers were fathers to their sons, or those who were as spiritual fathers: elders or rabbis who professed a spiritual genealogical descent or succession and exercised divine authority (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 49).

Wolf again moves deeper into pursuing the origins of this pattern of teaching based on justice, mercy and humility, which “David Wenham (1995), Oxford University, designates as ‘creation standards’ (p. 222; see also Balch, 1992; Bock, 1974; Brown, 1991; Demarest, 1982;

Dewick, 1953)” (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 119). Wolf traces the “creations standards” – this seminal code or pattern back to Rabbi Simon Justus (ca. 200 B.C.). In the *Pirke Aboth* (*Ethics of the Fathers*) Rabbi Justus would say, “On three things the world is stayed: on the *torah*, and on worship, and on the bestowal of kindness” (1:2) (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 120). According to Wolf, Selwyn (1946) made an important discovery and revealed an important clue linking the pattern of Torah instruction to the pattern of instruction to the New Testament. Wolf quotes Selwyn’s statement completely:

The principle of Doctrine–Worship–Good Works had been enunciated long before by the celebrated Rabbi Simon Justus, who used to say “On three things the world is stayed; on the *torah*, and on the Worship, and on the bestowal of Kindness”; and it is the clue to much that we find in the New Testament epistles (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 120).

Selwyn’s pattern of doctrine, worship and good works is a reformulation of Rabbi Justus’ “affirmation that on the three things of the *torah*, the worship, and the bestowal of kindness, the world is grounded” (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 120); as Selwyn (1946) stated above, “it is the clue to much that we find in the New Testament epistles” (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 122).

Conceptually Wolf made the connection from this creation pattern as seen in Rabbi Justus’ statement (*torah*/worship/bestowal of kindness) through the teaching of Jesus on Micah (justice/mercy/humility) to the teaching of the New Testament epistles composed by Paul, Peter and James. This link is beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless what is essential here for us to consider, is that Jesus, who was also a rabbi, positioned “Micah’s moral mark as the central weighty valuation of life” (Wolf, 2010a, p. 122). According to Wolf, Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 23:23 captures the essence of a moral standard expressed by Micah 6:8.

Without naysaying the value of tithing, Jesus unqualifiedly gave the overriding heaviest weight to the threefold creation standard, not the tithed seed kernels. The religious leaders had neglected and Jesus repositioned the “heavier/more important things of the *torah*” (Matt 23:23; Bromiley, 1985, pp. 95-96). To Jesus, justice, mercy, and faithfulness before God always carry weight. Those who did not see that were “blind guides,” “hypocrites”;

they were fully convinced that they were spiritually superior and morally exemplar, while in fact, according to Jesus' read, they actually were blind to their own inner condition and moral standing (Matt 23:24; compare Stenschke, 1999) (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, pp. 120-121).

For those who are Christians – followers of Jesus this moral link that Jesus made is vital as it bridges Judaic thought and teaching and connects us with the root of Christianity: Judaism.

Wolf (2010a) concludes that the triad of justice, mercy and humility could be seen as “a kind of moral breviary, a memorable moral short list for guiding life, the planetary compass pointing to creation's moral standard (Wolf, 2005, p. 69; see also Grant, 1995; Greeley, 1985; Grossman, 1996; Hanke, 1970, 1994; Wenham, 1995)” (as cited in, Wolf, 2010a, p. 121). In a world devastated by evil, not-right world, this pattern of Micah “becomes not just a moral criterion but also a personal, relational, and social critique” (p. 121). He believes that it is “recognized as proper and good” (p. 122) throughout the world and throughout time by men and women irrespective of culture, ethnicity or tradition. Finally, the creation standard is “intuitively recognized by all . . . [and] needs no introduction; it is intrinsically pre-known in the inner person. Among even rival worldviews, it appears to stand without contradiction” (p. 122).

Contemporary Expressions of Moral Standards

Ethics and morals are closely related concepts. Ethics are defined classically as judging or determining “whether human behavior is right or wrong” (Johnson, 2012, p. xxi). Ethics are principles that guide and govern human behavior. Morals on the other hand are “specific standards of right and wrong” (Johnson, 2012, p. xxi). How do we determine whether our moral or ethical behavior is right or wrong? Although we can recognize good and bad behavior around us, we cannot subjectively determine what is right or wrong. Globally we see what is considered

taboo in one country may be accepted practice in another. Does a moral or ethical standard exist? How are judgments made about right and wrong behavior?

Purpel (2008): Micah 6:8 – Being Morally Responsible

Purpel (2008) reflects upon how Micah 6:8 may reformulate education's vision of excellence and in his paper addresses the "hidden curriculum" found in education as conveyed in "the implicit values and attitudes that are being communicated to students;" he argues that society's pursuit of excellence leads to a fixation on competitive outcomes, consumerism and hierarchal struggles which only serve the individual's goals in the pursuit of social status and economic gains (p. 115). Purpel contrasts such educational views with those advanced by the prophet Micah, who "urges us to seek justice, loving-kindness, reverence, and joy," which leads ultimately to an educational experience that develops "students, who are morally responsible, dwell in community, seek justice, and care for others" (p. 115). What is salient here is not reforming the educational system of schools in the United States; instead what is important is how Purpel connects the moral values expressed in Micah 6:8 to the pursuit of excellence or what is best for society.

Critically he cites the work of Michael Fishbane, who wrote the book *Haftiarot* (2002); *haftiarot* is the Hebrew name assigned to the section of readings selected from the prophetic Books of the Bible, which are read along with portions from the Books of Moses or the Torah on the Sabbath and other religiously important days on the Jewish calendar. Fishbane in his book supplies annotations and commentary on the selections from the *haftiarah* and how they relate to the specific passage of the Bible with which they are paired. The importance for Purpel in citing Fishbane is how his "insight highlights the importance of what [of what Purpel calls] *what*-questions, and by that [he means] those questions that raise important issues and require

substantive responses” (p. 116). Purpel points out that Micah does consider questions regarding the quality of the sacrifice or how much we should sacrifice in order to satisfy some religious requirement. Instead Purpel contends that Micah asks us to consider the question: “What is the moral good and how are we to act morally” (p. 116)? Interestingly Micah does not end by asking such a question; he provides an answer to this question by pointing to acting justly, loving mercy and walking humbly before G-d. Such a view of morality is contested by other ideas concerning what determines or defines the values of justice, mercy and humility.

Purpel closes his treatment of Micah 6:8 by raising two issues. Firstly he believes that it is possible to do “God’s will” and work “toward a society permeated with loving-kindness, justice, and humility;” nevertheless, he reasons that another troubling obstacle “must be confronted: namely that some people do in fact accept this basic understanding of Micah's teaching but reject it because it seems impossible to achieve or (even more troubling) because they deny its validity, implicitly or otherwise” (p. 117). Unfortunately he concludes that although throughout history numerous people “have generally affirmed this and similar teachings as morally and pragmatically sound, there is considerable evidence that we as a people have been extraordinarily unable – perhaps even unwilling – to act on them to the degree that would make our world as loving and just as it needs to be. We have been taught a very good lesson, but we have not learned it very well” (p. 117).

Melé and Sánchez-Runde (2013): Cultural Diversity and Universal Ethics

In their article Melé and Sánchez-Runde (2013) present arguments for developing universal global ethics for business in a culturally diverse world. They note initially that Donaldson (1996), Jhingran (2001), Frederick (2002), Vendemiati (2008) and others consider differences in moral judgments and perceptions throughout world cultures. These differences

produce tension between what they term “moral universalism” and “moral cultural relativism” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 681). Moral universalism is seen in terms of “universal ethical principles or standards,” while moral cultural relativism is viewed as “local or cultural ethical norms” as being “the exclusive source of ethical standards” (p. 681). Krausz (1989) contends that moral relativism is favored among some ethicists whereas other ethicists reject a relativistic morality and embrace moral universalism (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682). Donaldson (1996) and Gowans (2012) represent a third group of ethicists, who advocate a balanced position between these ethical view points and propose “a set of basic ethical values or principles, and particular cultural norms;” on the other hand, other ethicists within this third group such as Küng (1998) and ITC (2009) wish to discover an “empirical or philosophical bases to promote global ethics” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682).

A critical need for common ethical core values exists. According to Bok (2002) if nations desire to develop a common basis creating cross-cultural dialogue and consider global issues, then it is imperative to determine, “which basic values can be shared across cultural boundaries” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682). Bok is not alone in advocating common values as The International Theological Commission (ITC) (2009) promotes common ethical values and praises those who seek them, noting that “only the recognition and promotion of these ethical values can contribute to the construction of a more human world” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682). Furthermore the ITC advocates that successful efforts toward developing common values globally must rely upon establishing a sound rudimentary agreement concerning “the goods and values that represent the most profound aspirations” of humanity (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682).

Melé and Sánchez-Runde (2013) outline and examine in their article five papers concerning universal ethics and cultural diversity presented at a symposium covering the topic: “Universal Ethics, Cultural Diversity, and Globalization” (p. 682). The authors selected these papers because they deal with moral diversity as an argument for moral relativism, the presence of globally shared values, the validity of universal ethical theories in a developing global world, natural law from a global perspective and human rights as an argument for proposing global business standards. They begin with the statement that moral diversity is universally endorsed while moral relativism is rejected by many. Moral relativists argue against ethical objectivity and universal ethical standards and believe that the “only source of truth for morality is each cultural context” (p. 682). The view of moral relativists, according to Gowans (2012), is that “the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 682).

Secondly Melé and Sánchez-Runde indicate that although there is some value agreement among cultures throughout world, these agreements are offset by significant differences. Authors such as Bowie (1990), Walzer (1994) and Bok (2002) state that at the very least there is a minimal or basic universal morality despite “whatever other moral differences” may exist (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 683). Additionally according to Bok (2002) societies have had to formulate a specific set of basic values in order for them to survive collectively and accordingly have produced a basic set of values, which are recognizable “across societal and other boundaries” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 683). Empirical research validates this basic set of values or principles and indicates that these values are found globally among various religious traditions. Lewis (1987), Wattles (1996), Moses (2001), Terry (2011)

and Tullberg (2011) have all documented a number of “foundational principles shared by all religions,” such as the Golden Rule (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 683). Finally Dahlsgaard and others (2005) identified a common “set of core virtues” among various world religions and cultures demonstrating “that there is convergence across time, place and intellectual tradition about certain core virtues: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance, humanity, and transcendence” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 683). Peterson and Seligman (2004) see these as universal values, while Finance (1991) indicates that these values are not far from Plato’s so called “cardinal virtues.” Other authors have added: “prudence (practical wisdom), justice, fortitude (courage), and temperance (moderation or self-control)” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 683).

Thirdly Melé and Sánchez-Runde indicate that moral universalism stands opposed to moral relativism and within its framework right and wrong behaviors are determined objectively and independently of social norms, customs or personal views or values. The construct of moral universalism has two aspects which may be or may not be seen as absolute morality or what is known as moral absolutism. Absolute universal morality, according to Bowie (1999) is Kantian Ethics and upholds “the position that the morality of some actions is independent of context or consequences” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 684). According to Snoeyenbos and Humber (2002) non-absolute moral universalism is expressed in Consequentialism and Utilitarianism; Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) contend that non-absolute universal morality is articulated by Integrative Social Contracts Theory, which embraces “both universal norms and local norms to evaluate the morality of an action” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 684). Such universal ethical or moral theories encompass sound principles for developing ethical

or moral standards; however, these theories conflict with each other due to differences in the self-evident principles employed in comprising their theory rationale.

Fourthly, Melé and Sánchez-Runde deliberate universal ethics in terms of natural moral law proposed by Murphy (2011) whose origins are found in the concept of natural law advanced by philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome, such as Cicero and during the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas. Natural law is not an unfamiliar notion as it is expressed in the Bible where it is evidently understandable to non-believers; the Apostle Paul argues in Romans 2:14-15 that such natural law is “written on their hearts [of men and women]” even to the point that “their consciences” bear witness to them and “their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times defending them.” Corso de Estrada (2008) points out that Cicero identified “the existence of a Reason (*mens*, in Latin) that rules the whole world;” it is “nature law” (*lex naturae*), which is “fully superior and divine, not mediated” and is “universal, absolutely primal, invariable and eternal, which humans should try to know and apply in their lives” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 684). Cicero, according to Horsley (1978), aligned himself other Stoic moral philosophers in their belief of natural law and is demonstrated by his statement that “living according to nature consists in living according to the dictates of right reason, which is quite clearly thought of as the common or universal law” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 684).

Finally the authors turn their attention to the to the United Nation’s, Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) (1948), which has been amended and updated several times to include “an exhaustive list of rights” for labor along with the UN Global Compact with its “ten ethical principles for business” (Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 685). According to Article 1 of UDHR, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are

endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (as cited in, Melé & Sánchez-Runde, 2013, p. 685). This statement ideally is powerful; however it raises theoretical and practical issues. Firstly, theoretically it raises the issue of foundational human rights, which is borne out by the statement of the Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993), which argues any human right “without morality cannot long endure” meaning that “without a solid [moral] foundation, any claim supported by strong lobbies can eventually be presented as a human right” (p. 685). Secondly, the practical issue raised speaks to the question of what part should business play in the implementation of human rights.

Connecting Academic Theories with the Moral and Ethical Values of Micah 6:8

In dictionary terms, mercy means to be “compassionate or kindly forbearance shown toward an offender, an enemy, or other person in one's power; *also*: lenient or compassionate treatment <begged for *mercy*>” (Meriam-Webster, 2012). Compassion is “an orientation that puts others ahead of self;” more so, this type of orientation focusing on others distinguishes “ethical leaders from their unethical colleagues” (Johnson, 2012, p. 89). When we care for others around us in our community or demonstrate compassion towards our community, we express the ethical ideas of altruism and communitarianism.

We may conclude that compassionate treatment of others is an ethic of care, which is known as altruism. Altruism demonstrates care toward people in need and generally does not expect anything in return. Since altruism is caring for other people, it is akin to love of neighbor. We can see that altruism closely mirrors loving mercy or loving-kindness from Micah 6:8. In Psalm 86:5, we read, “For You, Lord, are good, and ready to forgive, and abundant in lovingkindness [mercy] to all who call upon You.” Notice that God is good, ready to forgive

because of his “abundant” loving-kindness. Once more, we see that God’s mercy is loving-kindness. When considering altruism or love of neighbor, Johnson (2012) emphasizes this ethical consideration as “the ultimate ethical standard” (p. 170). I agree with Johnson’s conclusion; nevertheless, I would take into consideration the Jewish view of *tzedakah* (charity) and *gemilut chesed* (acts of loving-kindness), which I will address shortly in the section, titled: The Jewish Concept of Mercy, on page 22.

Communitarianism or caring for community is seen when members of the community “shoulder their responsibility and seek the common good” by sharing concern for “their fellow citizens” (Johnson, 2012, p. 164). Members of the community must in turn care, show concern for or “have significant obligations to their fellow citizens” (Johnson, 2012, p. 164).

Communitarianism is somewhat controversial because, it looks at society – what is best for the community and does not consider solely what is best for the needs of the individual. The communitarianism ethical theory is related to the Jewish understanding of social or collective responsibility. Much of what Jews understand about ethics and morality is derived from their understanding of God. Since they believe that G-d created the world and “*all* human beings,” (Telushkin, 2009, p. 10) we live in his creation – not alone but with G-d and each other. What this means is that we are to be concerned for each other and “care for other people in the same way as we care about ourselves” (Delcau, 2012, p. 9). This is our social responsibility because “All Jews are responsible for one another” (*Kol Yisrael arevim zeh lazeh*) (*Babylonian Talmud Shavuot 39a*) (as cited in, Telushkin, 1994, p. 91).

We see this ethic expressed or understood by Jews taking care of each other collectively or socially due to the fact that the Hebrew word for “responsible,” *ah-reivin/areyvut*, which “literally means ‘surety,’ one who makes himself responsible for another” (Telushkin, 1994, p.

91). Social responsibility is an integral component of the Jewish community; therefore with this understanding in mind, we must “be kind and generous to everyone, especially [to] people who do not have as much as we have” (Delcau, 2012, p. 9). If we understand our social responsibility, we will act justly toward one another and do the right thing. The Jewish people draw their understanding of social responsibility from the Babylonian Talmud (Ta'anit 11a) where it declares: “When the community is in trouble a person should not say, ‘I will go home and eat and drink and be at peace with myself’” (Telushkin, 1994, p. 94). The implications of this statement for the Jew is to be involved in the distress of the community as was Moses (Exodus 27:12), “who took upon himself his community’s pain;” the Talmud elaborates further, “one who shares in the distress of a community will merit to witness its deliverance” (Telushkin, 1994, p. 94).

Additionally we may consider the imperative from the Torah: “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:16), which does not only have in view murder, but social responsibility to act when someone is in need. Jews understand this verse to mean that we should not just stand “idly” by and be observers while something is happening to another person. It is our obligation to act and do something in order to help.

Kant’s categorical imperative of doing what is right no matter what, appears to be grounded in the Jewish ethic from Micah 6:8 of “acting justly,” which means doing the right thing. At times acting justly is costly for us personally when considering our personal interests versus the needs of others. As noted in Johnson (2012, p. 160), some disagree with the universal nature of Kant’s argument because he asserts that “there are universal principles that should be followed in every situation.” I think that Kant’s ethical strategy is grounded in justice or righteousness (justice – doing what is right) that is required of G-d. This sort of righteousness

demonstrates integrity of character, which I believe is also described in Micah 6:8 by “walking humbly.” The way we “walk” or live our lives reveals our character. Integrity is best seen by truthfulness in our dealings. When leaders accept bribes, do what is best for them or lie or mislead, we see a lack of integrity. I believe that people universally desire to see right actions in corrupt times.

Humane Orientation

R. House, Javidan, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) outline the parameters of the GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) Study, which is a multi-country/culture case study of nine dimensions of leadership and culture in 62 nations. These dimensions are: performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, power distance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and gender egalitarianism. Humane orientation may be defined as “the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others” (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2009). Kabaskal and Bodur (2004) explain further that “this dimension is manifested in the way people treat one another and in the social programs institutionalized within each society” (p. 569). Simply stated humane orientation is concerned with the welfare of humanity.

Descriptions of humane behavior are not new but have existed since antiquity and “ideas and values” related to this dimension may be found among “classic Greek philosophers” and “in the teachings of many of the major religions of the world” (Kabaskal & Bodur, 2004, p. 565). The major idea embedded in the classical Greek understanding concerning this human attribute is reciprocal as well as mutual love found in friendship. Humans are interrelated and connected to each other; therefore, love or concern for others is a fundamental expression of humanity.

Humane orientation is expressed differently across cultures along a continuum from high to low humane orientation in societies and institutions. Briefly, the concept of humane orientation is not unique; it is related to what Hofstede and Bond (1988) called “Kind Heartedness.” It is also related to the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) regarding “Human Nature Is Good vs. Human Nature Is Bad.” We also see a connection with the work of Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) regarding their treatment of “the Civic Society” and from McClelland (1985) and his concepts concerning “the affiliative motive.” Furthermore, Price (1989), Dover (1980) and Ferrari (1987) looked at how classical Greek philosophers of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates viewed interpersonal relationships. Triandis (1995) addressed culture theory and said that “altruism, benevolence, kindness, love and generosity” are important factors to consider with regards to social behaviors of people.

Yousif and Korte (1995) – examines “social contact, help exchanges and attitudes toward helpfulness” in urbanized and smaller towns in England and Sudan. Yousif and Korte (1995) analyze what they term “urban un-helpfulness” or “lower levels of helpfulness” in urban and non-urban settings in England and the Sudan (p. 474). The instrument that they used was a questionnaire and men and women were randomly surveyed in the center of cities in four locations located in the two countries. The study found significant is that “the urban un-helpfulness effect is very robust across quite diverse cultural variations and that it is not reducible simply to an attitudinal or normative explanation” (Yousif & Korte, 1995, p. 488).

The GLOBE Study acknowledges the role of religion in shaping our understanding of what humane behavior is. In Judaism, Islam and Christianity, G-d is seen as the “ultimate” source of “goodness” and requires “humane-orientated behaviors and doing good to others,” while Eastern Religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, “there is no God that gives orders in the

direction of goodness;" instead, individuals must "harmonize" themselves with the "cosmic rhythm" and do what is "good" (Kabaskal & Bodur, 2004, p. 565).

The GLOBE Study also addresses dominant social practices such as altruism and generosity and the role of the family in shaping human behavior. Kabaskal and Bodur (2004) also trace the development of human rights and humane orientation as seen in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issues by the United Nations in 1948. One interesting fact emerged from the GLOBE Study concerning Humane Orientation in relationship to Power Distance. These two dimensions share a significant negative correlation ($r = -.42, p < .01$) along with a significant positive correlation ($r = .35, p < .01$) with assertive practices. The authors conclude that the above findings indicate that in societies "that value humane orientation" they "seek to reduce power distance and use assertive practices possibly to fight injustice" (Kabaskal & Bodur, 2004, p. 574), which echoes "tenderness and concern for others."

Schlösser et al. (2013) contradicts the original findings of the GLOBE Study (R. J. House, 2004). Quantitative study: "A multicountry construct validation study used student samples from 25 countries that were either high or low in humane orientation ($N = 876$) and studied their relation to the traditional GLOBE scale and other cultural-level measures (agreeableness, religiosity, authoritarianism, and welfare state score) (p. 536). Schlösser et al. criticize the GLOBE Study's treatment of humane orientation and state that it is "ambivalence toward this concept;" delineate treatment of humane orientation with regards to members of "in-group" and "out-group" and point to a study by Bond et al. (2004), which "identified a positive relation of humane orientation with 'dynamic externality' (a measure of a naive belief in a just world with authoritarian streaks) and a combination of high religiosity and superstitious beliefs"

(Schlösser et al., 2013, p. 536). The findings demonstrated “a strong correlation between humane orientation and agreeableness, welfare state score, and religiosity” (p. 536).

I may link the concept of humane orientation with the Jewish concern for humanity as Soloveitchik (as cited in Wyschogrod, 1986, para. 10) postulates that Jews have always been part of humanity and are for this reason “committed to the general welfare and progress of mankind,” desiring to combat disease and “in alleviating human suffering, in protecting man's rights, in helping the needy, etcetera.” I would also like to connect humane orientation with the Jewish concept of mercy or *chesed* or *chesed shel-emet* (חסד של אמת) meaning literally "kindness of truth" or true loving-kindness (Sienna, 2006).

The Jewish Concept of Mercy

In the Micah 6:8, we see that mercy is derived from the Hebrew word, *chesed*, which means treating others with kindness, literally loving-kindness. This type of kindness shows concern or care for others; furthermore, we understand this sort of kindness as compassion. The Jewish Talmud considers compassion to be “the hallmark of an ethical person” and it “is *the* defining characteristic of being a Jew” (Telushkin, 2006, p. 20). By being merciful or compassionate, we demonstrate that we care for what was important to someone else, which could be an injustice, a misdeed, or an emotional pain. The best way to show compassion is through a loving deed – an act of kindness in an attempt to make right what was wrong. In so doing, we are able to display the character and heart of G-d. Recall that G-d “saved us, not because of righteous things we had done, but because of his mercy” (Titus 3:5) – his kindness toward us.

The understanding of charity begins in the Bible and expressed to us through the Jewish people. The Hebrew word, *tzedakah* (charity) is derived from the word *tzadik*, “meaning

righteousness, fairness or justice” and “refers to the religious obligation to perform charity, and philanthropic acts, which Judaism emphasizes, are important parts of living a spiritual life” (“Tzedakah,” 2012). We see that this ethical consideration is mirrored in altruism. However, the Jewish concept of *gemilut chesed* (sometimes rendered *khesed* or *chasadim*) expresses a much deeper concern for those around us through acts of loving-kindness. Telushkin (2001) explains that *gemilut chesed* “usually refers to a special type of *mitzvah*, one that is performed with no expectation of reward” (p. 596). Many Jews understand this word to mean, “good deed;” however, it really means “commandment” (Telushkin, 2001, p. 553). He goes on to elaborate the subtle difference albeit major difference between these two concepts by explaining that a good deed “implies a voluntary act,” while commandment infers “an obligatory” act (p. 553). He clarifies this difference by stating that Western cultures view voluntary acts “to be on a higher plane than an obligatory one;” however, the Talmud (*Kiddushin 31a*) considers this issue differently: “Greater is he who is commanded and carries out an act, than he who is not commanded, and carries it out” as cited in, Telushkin (2001, p. 553). Finally, he directs us to the Babylonian Talmud (*Sukkot 49b*) where we read that “Our Rabbis taught that *gemilut chesed* (acts of loving kindness) is greater than *tzedakah* (charity) in three ways (Telushkin, 1994, p. 24):

1. Charity is done with one’s money, while loving-kindness may be done with one’s money or with one’s person [e.g., spending time with a sick person].
2. Charity is given only to the poor, while loving-kindness may be given both to the poor and the rich [e.g., consoling one who is in mourning or depressed].
3. Charity is given only to the living, while loving-kindness may be shown to both the living and the dead [e.g., by arranging a proper burial for a person who died indigent].

The major difference, as Jews view the difference, between charity and acts of loving-kindness rests on the concept of repayment. When considering the burial of the dead *gemilut chesed* (loving-kindness) it is viewed as “par excellence because it necessarily is done without

any hope that the ‘recipient’ will repay the good deed” (Telushkin, 1994, p. 25). Furthermore, Telushkin (1994) indicates that a rabbi, Haffetz Hayyim, considered *gemilut chesed* as “any good deed that one does for another without getting something in return (*Ahavat Chesed*)” (Telushkin, 1994, p. 25).

While reading *The Diary of Anne Frank*, Telushkin (2009) realized another distinction between charity and kindness. Charity may be done whenever “an opportunity presents itself, while kindness can be done at any time” (p. 138), when in 1944 Anne Frank writes in her diary,

How lovely to think that no one need wait a moment before making the world better. We can start now slowly changing the world! . . . You can always, always, always give something, even if it is only kindness. Give, give again, don’t lose courage. Keep it up and go on giving. No one has ever become poor from giving.

Anne Frank was a young Jewish girl, who lived in the Netherlands near Amsterdam and, who was a victim of the Shoah. Anne hid with her family from the Nazi occupiers in a secret room eventually being betrayed and transported to a German concentration camp toward the end of the Second World War. Sadly, Anne died of typhus in March 1945, a few months prior to the end of the war. Considering Anne’s words about kindness and giving as a means to make the world a better place, it is clear that even as a young teenager she had a good moral or ethical foundation.

In light of these considerations, I would say that instead of altruism, I would follow the Jewish ethical idea or understanding of *gemilut chasadim* and practice loving-kindness or compassion as my ethical construct to make decisions because it keeps us from expecting to be repaid for our kindness. By understanding this type of kindness, we are able to understand G-d’s compassion for us and thereby direct this kind of compassion (loving kindness) toward others in our community. Wolf (2010b) calls this “social compassion.”

The Prophetic Voice

Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel wrote (as cited in "The reasons for my involvement in the Peace Movement," 2001, para. 5-6):

“There is immense silent agony in the world, and *the task of man is to be a voice for the plundered poor*, to prevent the desecration of the soul and the violation of our dream of honesty. The more deeply immersed I became in the thinking of the prophets, the more powerfully it became clear to me what *the lives of the Prophets sought to convey: that morally speaking, there is no limit to the concern one must feel for the suffering of human beings*, that *indifference to evil is worse than evil itself*, that in a free society, some are guilty, but all are responsible.”

One difficult issue that I have encountered in my work of caring for and restoring Jewish cemeteries in Poland is indifference. It is not an “indifference to evil” that Heschel has in mind; nevertheless, it is apathy or a lack of concern. I find indifference among Jews of Polish origins and Christians. To the Jew caring for the dead, which includes caring for a cemetery, is not optional. To do so is to obey the Torah and by so doing fulfill what is known as a mitzvah. According to Rabbi Heschel (as cited in Eckstein, 1984, p. 66), “the central issue in Judaism is the mitzvah, the sacred act.” So, Heschel is saying that “the task of man is to be a voice” for those who have no voice. The Jews who were exterminated during the Shoah have no voice, so where is the concern?

The Jewish Prophets, such as Micah and Hosea spoke about to the issue of mercy – literally the concern for others. The person of Jesus Christ, a Jewish rabbi, also unquestionably spoke to the importance of mercy. Jesus taught that keeping the Torah is important; however, he emphasized that observing it should be done without “neglecting the more important matters of the Law: justice, mercy and faithfulness” (Matthew 23:23). Jesus also pointed to what the Prophet Hosea (Hoshea) wrote of G-d, “For I desire mercy (loving-kindness), not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of God rather than burnt offerings (Hosea 6:6).”

A Summary of the Construction

We may summarize these above concepts in Table 1, Summary of the Moral Standard (immediately below):

Table 1: Summary of the Moral Standard

Micah 6:8	Jeremiah 7:5-7	Matthew 23:23	Ethical Concept	Ethical Worldview (Wolf, 2010b)
Act justly	Do not live as you are; change your ways and actions and deal with each other justly	Justice	Kant's "Do what is right"	"Preserving justice (hope)" Social responsibility
Love mercy	Do not oppress the weak or shed innocent blood; show mercy, care/love for others	Mercy	Altruism Communitarianism	"Social compassion (charity)"
Walk humbly	Do not follow other gods; be faithful to the One True God	Faithfulness	Humility Integrity	Integrity having "leadership discipline (faith)"

Understanding the cross-cultural importance of humane orientation – concern for others, along with Jewish views regarding the Torah and its application, allow me to accentuate and amplify the mission of TMF. Hence from Micah 6:8 and the Jewish understanding of mercy (loving-kindness), I have a global and culturally appropriate template from which to approach the Jewish community of Polish origins regarding dialogue or interaction. Consequently I can continue to build the bridge of mercy (loving-kindness) and be better able to approach the Jewish community and thereby continue to restore the relationship between Jews and Christians. Once the bridge of mercy is constructed, the possibility of dialogue emerges; I am able to begin traveling along the road of dialogue, which is a road that is always under construction.

The Destruction of the Shoah

Auschwitz is a museum today, visited by millions of people annually; however, the event it represents – the Shoah, still cries out, demanding justice for innocent victims murdered in its

gas chambers. An article that I read in *The Guardian* captures the enduring legacy of hatred and the impact the Shoah has on the world today; it states, “As at Auschwitz, the gates of hell are built and torn down by human hearts, a wrenching debate about anti-Semitism in Poland's past leads us, in the end, to ask questions about ourselves” (Ash, 2009). I have visited Auschwitz on numerous occasions. Every time I visit, I stand in silence surveying what remains and ask myself, “Why?” By not being Jewish many Christians have great difficulty grasping completely in its fullest and most realistic sense the meaning of Shoah – it is utter destruction as their world was nearly completely destroyed or deconstructed. We can never completely understand why the Holocaust occurred. But it did occur. And it must be faced.

Factors Leading to the Shoah

The seeds of destruction were sown long before the unfolding of the mass murder of millions of innocent Jews. The first kernel of destruction centered on the Jewish figure of Jesus Christ, which according to Bauer (2001) produced the “false myth” that “the Jews” murdered Jesus, which produced “one of the most destructive and murderous legends in human history” (p. 20). Christian anti-Semites embraced this false myth and promulgated it over the centuries whipping “up passion and aggressions against a whole people and their civilization” (p. 20), meaning the Jews. In modern times this false myth has been repudiated by the Roman Catholic Church (1965), who “declared that ‘the Jews’ of Jesus’s time could not be held responsible for the crucifixion” (p. 20); nevertheless the false myth persistently remains even to today. The second seed of destruction was that of pogroms – organized massacres of particularly Jews (Merriam-Webster, 2012) executed upon the Jews of Europe during the Middle Ages as they “wandered from place to place in Christendom in search of a haven,” but only found sanctuary in Poland as they “were brutally expelled” from all other countries (p. 23). Massacres of Jews

occurred in Germany in 1196, England in 1290, and “throughout Europe during the Black Death epidemic in 1347 – 50” (p. 23).

In response to their persecution at the hands of their Christian neighbors, Bauer determines that Jews turned inwardly concentrating on prayer, studying Torah and traditions and “developing the richness of the interpretative moral story (sing., *midrash*; pl., *midrashim*)” along with an increasing concern “with political life” (p. 23). Bauer concludes that such an inward turn that enriched “the spiritual and social life of the [Jewish] community, was probably the salvation of the Jews,” as it produced a “rich social and intellectual inner world” allowing the Jews “to face hostile external reality” (p. 24). The third seed of destruction arose from the advent of Islam and the Moslem campaign to conquer and convert Europe to Islam. To their Moslem conquerors, Christians and Jews were considered not as pagans but as “People of the Book” and were consequently seen “as a notch higher than the pagans;” nonetheless, the war raged against them to convert to Islam (p. 25). Jews were also massacred “under Moslem rule” in Spain (1010, 1013, and 1066), Yemen (1627 – 29), in Iran (1826) and “under Turkish rule in Damascus in 1840” (p. 25).

The fourth seed of destruction was the collapse of Christendom and its division into Catholic and Protestant factions, which as Bauer concludes “did not aid the Jews,” as Protestant Lutherans were “rabidly hostile” toward the Jews because they would not “accept their new religion” (p. 33). One leader of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther, advocated that Jewish synagogues should be burned, Jewish homes should be “broken down and destroyed,” Jewish prayer books and Talmuds should be confiscated and finally that “their rabbis must be forbidden under threat of death to teach anymore” (as cited in, Axel, 1979, p. 129; and in, Bauer, 2001, p. 33). Against such a backdrop, there later emerged the philosophical age of enlightenment in

which philosophers such as Francois-Marie de Voltaire expressed an anti-Jewish philosophy which “did not differ materially from the extreme anti-Jewishness of St. John Chrysostom” (p. 35).

Expressions of Modern Anti-Semitism

Traditional Christian anti-Judaism perceives Jewish difficulties as punishment for rejecting Jesus Christ as the Messiah and for murdering him. Bauer (2001) also considers that this traditional view incorporates into its myth the element of “economic misbehavior” by the Jews and “in more extreme cases the myth of the Jew’s ‘desire to control the world’” (p. 48). Such a traditional anti-Semitic view is stereotypical and rests upon “resentment and hatred” focusing on Jews generally and not specifically on actual Jewish people living in Jewish communities (p. 48). Summarizing the traditional view of Christian anti-Judaism, Bauer concludes that “as only a people possessed by the Devil could have killed God, Jews and Judaism were often seen as the work or the symbol of Satan” (p. 48). Against the traditional views of anti-Semitism espoused by Christian anti-Judaism, Bauer outlines four major constructs of modern anti-Semitism:

1. Jews were excluded from the Romantic Movement during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. This movement exalted “folkways” and emphasized “the purity of the national tradition” – a more romantic past of “legends of knights, chivalry, and endless strife and wars” (p. 49). The movement excluded those who did not share in an “idealized past,” and since “Jews were strangers,” they did not live as “quite-equal citizens” in European countries (p. 49).
2. Modern capitalism produced class antagonism producing “an extreme stand” among such “socialist and anarchist thinkers as Charles Fourier, Pierre Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, and Karl Marx,” who accused “Jews of initiating capitalism” (p. 49). Marx himself “equated Judaism with the ideology and practice of capitalism” and advocated that by defeating capitalism, “Judaism and Jews would vanish” (p. 49). Such theories Bauer concludes “would later light genocidal fires” (p. 49).
3. Social Darwinism contributed to the development of modern anti-Semitism. In 1850, the Englishman, Herbert Spencer, advanced the theory of “constant struggle between

- humans in which the strongest would win” – it was not the survival of the “fittest” as Darwin later postulated but the survival of the “strongest” (p. 49).
4. Anti-Semitism progressed to racism via the linguistic research of Christian Lassen, who postulated in the 1840s that “Semites” spoke in “a variety of tongues” and “were egotistical and exclusive,” while Indo-Europeans “were tolerant and altruistic” due to the fact that their “languages stemmed from a common origin” (p. 50).

In Bauer we see that these four streams converge producing the idea of the “Aryan” race, a concept introduced in 1854 by Count Arthur Joseph de Gobineau in his book, *Inequality of the Human Races*. The traits of the Aryan race are that of being “blond, tall, blue-eyed – a superior, culture-bearing people in line with Social Darwinism thought” (p. 50). Gobineau did not apply his theorem to the Jewish people; nonetheless, later philosophers would make this connection. Rather prophetically the French anthropologist, Vacher-de-Lafouge and who agreed with the Aryan philosophy stated, “I am convinced that in the course of the next century millions of people will kill each other because of a one-degree difference in their skull-index” (p. 50). He correctly foreshadowed the racial prejudices underpinning Nazi Germany’s racist policies, which ultimately led to World War II and the Shoah.

As an proponent of the racial differences theory, Bauer points to Richard Wagner, who espoused a “German nationalistic terminology called *völkisch* (people-integral nationalistic);” Wagner also advocated German “emancipation from Judaism and Christianity,” which led him in due course to compose music glorifying “a Germanic religion based on pagan elements” (p. 50). Philosophers such as Eugen Duehring and Paul de Lagarde connected the racial differences theory to the anti-Christian and anti-Judaic factors advanced by Gobineau earlier. Race and later blood became the determining factors in a person’s identity – blood was the vehicle transmitting “the characteristics of race and was the both the symbol and the content of purity or lack of it;” when applied to the prevalent contemporary theories of hereditary, this line of reasoning would logically produce the thinking that “no amount of baptismal water could change a Jew” (p. 50).

Lastly in 1878 or 1879, Bauer discusses Wilhem Marr, who introduced the term anti-Semitism. Prior to its introduction the concept of anti-Semitism was expressed by using terms “inherited from the Christian period;” the two terms were: Judenhass (Jew-hatred) and Judeophobia (p. 51). Problematically German society was becoming more secularized and did not believe in Jesus, so the question of who killed Jesus became increasingly irrelevant, which led Marr, Duehring, de Lagarde and other such racists to develop new language that was more scientific, modern and that did not contain “the word Jew” to express their racist, anti-Jewish views (p. 51). Anti-Semitism became that word.

According to Bauer, George L. Mosse, a historian, studied the development of relations between the Jews and Germans in the run up to the nineteenth century and concludes that “German anti-Semitism is a part of German intellectual history” (as cited in, Bauer, 2001, p. 54). Mosse also embraces the treatment of the Jew in German popular literature and sees stereotypical views of Jews emerge portraying the Jew as an outcast, the alien and as one, who could never be considered as one of them – “as the *Volk*” (as cited in, Bauer, 2001, p. 54). In German literature, Jews were presented as “the eternal ‘other,’ the symbol of foreignness, of dark and evil forces, forever polluting the purity of the German people” (p. 55). As illustrations of these portrayals, Mosse points to the authors Felix Kahn and Gustav Freytag and how they treat the German and the Jews. For Kahn the German people are the protagonists, while the Jew is the villain, “a traitor,” who “speaks a foreign language” and commits “destructive acts” (as cited in, Bauer, 2001, p. 55). Freytag presents the German hero as “old, honest, pure, the German ideal of the middle classes,” while on the other hand he presents the Jewish antagonist as “puny pale, has red curly hair, is poor and slovenly in dress” (as cited in, Bauer, 2001, p. 55).

Lastly Bauer details the rise of political anti-Semitism as a factor in Germany with the publication of Heinrich von Treitschke “series of antisemitic articles in the prestigious *Preussische Jahrbücher* in 1879” (Bauer, 2001, p. 55), which led to changes being made in the German government’s policies toward Jews and ultimately to become a lethal force in Nazi policy. However Bauer notes that “while antisemitism, including its radical and potentially lethal manifestations, became influential among the German intellectual and power elites, it was far from endemic in German society” (p. 56). Bauer argues that it is a mistake to claim that Germans have within their genetic makeup “an inclination toward Jew-hatred from the Middle Ages” forward as researchers such as Daniel J. Goldhagen have postulated (p. 56). Bauer concludes that German society was not “pre-ordained” nor “pre-determined” to identify with the Nazi program of liquidating the Jews (p. 56).

Nazi Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism was not the primary focus of Nazi propaganda between 1929 and 1933 albeit it was present; instead their propaganda entailed concerns for “unemployment, social security . . . Germany’s status among nations and the territories it [Germany] lost in World War I” (p. 97). Bauer states “the Nazis did not add any new elements to antisemitism – except their determination to implement it;” nevertheless, Nazi anti-Semitic ideology developed eventually combining elements of traditional anti-Semitism and “pseudoscientific nineteenth-century antisemitism” (p. 97). Bauer outlines five basic components of Nazi anti-Semitic policy:

1. The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, which contained the Jewish world-conspiracy theory, “were adopted as an article of faith” (p. 97).
2. The ideology of the Nazi Party appropriated the traditional Christian symbol of the Jew being “possessed by the Devil” and “viewed the Jew as the Devil himself,” transforming the former traditional Christian symbol “into content: the Jew *was* the Devil, in Nazi eyes” (p. 97).

3. According to the Nazi party a Jewish world government existed. Throughout the Shoah the Nazis diligently searched for elements of this Jewish government believing that Jews control “the Western ‘plutocracies’ and Russian bolshevism” (p. 97).
4. The racist ideologies, developed in the nineteenth-century postulating that one race was superior to another, were consistent Nazi ideology.
5. Jews were believed to be “non-humans” and seen by Hitler “as a kind of anti-race,” which led to the segregation of Jews from the German society so that it would eliminate contact and thereby “corrupt German blood and culture” (p. 97). It is not difficult to envision the next logical step in the Nazi progression for “the possibility of annihilation,” which naturally progressed from traditional Christian stereotypes of the Jews as being the “Other,” being different and “somehow inherently dangerous” – Jews were a “parasitic force” that “would ultimately destroy the cultures of their host nations” (p. 97).

In the end the Nazis concluded that Aryan Germans were to “rule the world” and “not the Jews,” which became “the central pillar in their [Nazi] world view” embracing anti-Semitism (p. 97).

Bauer argues firstly that Nazi policies regarding the Jewish question were not well defined and were not worked out until “*after* Kistallnacht” – the night of broken glass, which occurred on the night of 9-10 November 1938, and concludes that this “pogrom itself can hardly be considered as a way-station to the Holocaust in terms of a planned policy” (p. 117). Secondly, the Jews had to pay an enormous fine to the Nazi party as result of the death Ernst vom Rath, a German embassy official in Paris, who was shot on 7 November 1938 by Herschel Grynszpan. Grzynszpan, a Polish Jew and whose parents were deported from Germany to Poland, acted in retribution against the deportation by the Gestapo in October 1938 of non-German Jews, who were Polish nationals. Thirdly, the Jews were “finally and totally evicted from German economic life” after Kristallnacht effectively eliminating the employment of Jews (p. 117) opening the way for the Nazis to develop the final solution to the Jewish question.

Nazi Policies and Christian Dissent

The Nazi ideologies and subsequent policies of Germany according to Bauer (2001) led to an anti-Christian movement, which denied “the brotherhood of man” and denied “the

Fatherhood of God;” Nazism “promoted a *volk* community that would be free of the influences of churches (p. 142). Hitler as the Führer was the “secular authority” and the “messenger of God” and as such was “the interpreter of the scriptures” (p. 142). A mainstream view of German Protestantism was “*Cuius regio, eius religio* (whoever rules determines the religion),” which advocated submission to “secular Christian authority” unless it was contradictory to “scriptural commandments” (p. 142). The implications of such a frame of reference led to the establishment effectively of a Reich Church or the “so-called German Christian Church” as the representative of the Protestant Church to the Nazi government, which embraced Hitler’s “national revival” and enabled it to engage in “the fight against pacifism, socialism, Freemasonry and the Jews” (p. 142).

Opponents to the Reich Church or the German Christian Church persecuted and “by February 1934 some seventy pastors had been sent to concentration camps” (p. 142). The Christian dissidents to the Reich were led by Martin Niemöller, who was a “German nationalist, commander of a submarine in World War I and a national hero” and he accepted the new status quo of Nazi Germany initially but later “he refused to recognize the right of secular authorities to determine matters of conscience for individuals and denied the state’s claims of supremacy over Christians” (pp. 142-143). In 1934, a group of traditional pastors established the Confessing Church (Bekennende Kirche, BK) and in a statement written largely authored by Karl Barth, the Protestant theologian, the BK committed itself to the Gospel of Jesus Christ as “the inviolable foundation of the German Evangelical Church” (p. 143). The Barmen declaration rejected the Nazi ideology of the Führer as a special ruler and it also rejected the idea that the State is able to order and control human life.

Bauer lastly points to several key Christian dissidents who courageously opposed the Reich. Bishop Theophil Wurm opposed “mercy killing (euthanasia)” and spoke out against Jewish persecution; Ludwig Steil “defended the Jews and died in a Nazi camp” (p. 143). Pastor Heinrich Grüber endured life in a concentration camp for assisting “both converted and non-converted Jews” and following the war he testified at the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 (p. 143). Bauer reasons that “of the thousands of pastors and church leaders who were imprisoned about 500 died” and of this number was Dietrich Bonhoeffer who “was murdered in a Nazi prison as an anti-Nazi resistor” (p. 144). Although Bonhoeffer like many of his contemporary pastors espoused the separation of Jews from German society along with other racial ideas regarding the Jews as “legitimate,” he reasoned that the central Nazi viewpoint regarding the Jewish question was “paganism” and consequently concluded that “only he who cries out for the Jews may sing the Gregorian chant” (p. 144).

Major Events of the Shoah

In January 1933 Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany and began the radical transformation of Germany. His plan was simple: nullify the undesirables – concentration camps for political prisoners and mentally ill, multiply the desirables – *Lebensborn* – maternity homes run by the SS (Kampf, 2013, p. 23) relying upon eugenics for biologically and racially pure Aryan traits, and finally liquidate the barriers (thus, discriminatory actions against Jews, considered the primary hindrances to pure Aryan racial development) in order to establish German supremacy in Europe. In September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland and unleashed his attack not only upon a military enemy but innocent people principally, who were Jews. He began by progressively reducing the rights and freedom of the Jewish population and then finally herded them into ghettos. In the summer of 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and began the

systemic extermination of Jews through the use of *Einsatzgruppen* or mobile killing units (Bauer, 2001, p. 210), which in the end proved to be ineffective and costly. For this reason, Hitler ordered the development of a plan to answer the Jewish question or what is known as the Final Solution. *Aktion Reinhard* was the code name for the plan to eliminate European Jews (Bauer, 2001, pp. 226-230).

Hitler's Aktion plan called for the development of an efficient method to execute large numbers of Jews. The Chełmno extermination camp (originally called the Kulmhof concentration camp), near Łódź, Poland, was the first concentration camp that was used to perfect the method for the mass murder and disposal of Jews. What developed out of this experimentation was the construction of three extermination camps in Nazi occupied Poland: Treblinka, Sobibor and Belżec. These "death camps" were built not to profit from slave labor like German concentration camps but were designed to liquidate the lives of the Jewish people.

The ultimate purpose of these death camps was the mass extermination of Jews upon arrival. Between 1942 and 1943 nearly one and a half million Jews perished in these three death camps. The Nazis advanced their methods from the lessons learned at Chełmno and the Aktion camps and applied them at the Majdanek and Auschwitz concentration camps. At Auschwitz the Nazi system was perfected culminating in the systematic and effective mass murder of innocent people. Estimates place the death toll at Auschwitz between 1.1 and 1.5 million people with the overwhelming majority of them being European Jews. In the end Hitler's solution to the Jewish question resulted in what we know today as the Holocaust and the extermination of 6 million European Jews of which more than half were Jews from Poland.

Trauma from the Shoah

World War II in Europe was a political and economic trauma for the Jews. But more so than that, it was a spiritual devastation – literally destruction to which Jews refer today as the Shoah. Of the 11 million European civilians, who died during the Second World War, six million people died simply because they were Jewish; the number of deaths is staggering when considering the fact that eighty percent of the European Jewish population perished or was exterminated at the hands of the Nazis within the six year period of the war (Krysińska & Lester, 2006, p. 141). It is difficult to understand the scale and depth of the collective trauma suffered by the Jews during the Shoah. Researchers, such as Krysińska and Lester (2006), have examined “empirical research and clinical observations concerning the long-term consequences” arising from the trauma of the Shoah suffered by European Jews (p. 142). These researchers note the gross injustice committed by Nazi Germany against an innocent group of people – the Jews. Furthermore, European Jews had suffered persecution at the hand of their neighbor for centuries; however, during the era of the Second World War and the Shoah, the Jewish people endured at the hands of the Nazis “the most severe and unprecedented oppression and terror” in their history (Krysińska & Lester, 2006, p. 142).

The authors also report that secondary trauma has been seen among “professionals working with trauma survivors” and concluded that the transmission of the trauma “does not necessarily require direct contact with survivors” but may arise from merely “working with documents, movies, photographs and other objects connected with trauma” resulting in traumatization vicariously (p. 147). They examined research concerning the long-term effects of the “KZ/survivor syndrome” (Konzentrationslager or concentration camp syndrome) which expressed itself somatically in physical maladies (headaches, chest pains, digestive problems),

psychologically in mental disorders, cogitatively in mental impairment, and socially in the breakdown of social and interpersonal functions, such as “withdrawal and alienation” (p. 143). The authors point out that research into this area focused primarily on “problems and weaknesses” of individuals and for this reason researchers looked the adaption skills of survivors, who as they said, had to survive in the most difficult circumstances imaginable, yet found ways to find “meaning for life,” which ultimately enabled them to survive (p. 146).

They next turn their attention to Second Generation issues found among the children of Holocaust survivors. They characterized these issues as “secondary” or “vicarious traumatization,” which they noted result in extended “changes in the individuals’ attitudes towards the world” and those around them (p. 147). Interestingly, the most extensive section of Krysińska’s and Lester’s article deals with “attempted and committed suicide” by Jews across five distinct phases of the Holocaust: persecution, deportation, life in ghettos and concentration camps, and among survivors following the war (pp. 149-154). Lastly the authors address the issue of what psychological help is available for the survivors of the Holocaust and to their children (pp. 154-155).

I found that this article presented a great deal of research concerning the psychological aspects of the Holocaust that I have not yet considered academically. I have read a great deal of biographies and history regarding the Holocaust and at times I have seen and felt the trauma vicariously. Now I understand how secondary trauma functions which gives me greater understanding. It is perhaps for this reason that I have embarked upon my journey to speak to the injustice of the Holocaust today. Judith Lewis Herman describes I believe what I am doing in this way; she writes, “remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both

for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims” (as cited in, Krondorfer, 2012, p. 308). For me I see in the quote what has become my life purpose.

The Polish Context of the Shoah

The context of Poland is important as is the relationship that Jews and Poles have shared over their long history, which at times has been strained and embittered. The events of the Shoah – the Nazi Final Solution – only worked to exacerbate the difficulty in their relations even further. Common belief is that the Nazi regime chose Poland for the setting of the Final Solution because of Polish anti-Semitism; however, this is not the case. The Nazis chose Poland strategically “as their gigantic laboratory for mass murder” simply for the reason that Poland was the home to the largest Jewish population in Europe (Zimmerman, 2003b, p. 3). Louise Steinman (2013), the daughter of Polish Jewish mother and Ukrainian Jewish father, describes the contemporary relationship that Jews and Poles share. There is emptiness in the space of her family’s history prior to the Shoah. She concludes that the relationship between Jews and Poles is complicated and difficult even though they share a common past. According to Steinman “most [Jews] harbored more bitterness toward Poland than they did toward Germany” even though they were once “part of Poland’s body and soul, but they’d been excised, cast out” (p. xi).

Although the Shoah was not conceived by Poles, it “had tainted Polish soil forever” (Zimmerman, 2003b, p. 6). Dealing with the aftermath of such a tragic event would require cleansing Poland and its people from this “terrible burden of history” by allowing the Polish people to see themselves and their country “in the light of truth” (Zimmerman, 2003b, p. 6). The Shoah as such “is the tragedy of the Poles” because during dark days of the Nazi extermination of the Jews, Poles “were exposed to an unprecedented moral trial” through which it would be difficult to say if anyone else “would have come through it better” (Zimmerman, 2003b, p. 7).

Moreover, Poles were eyewitnesses and saw firsthand the events of the Shoah and the plight of their Jewish neighbors. At times Poles were noble and assisted their neighbors under the threat of execution and on other occasions, they were slightly more than bystanders doing little or nothing to protect their Jewish neighbors from the Nazi brutality.

Nonetheless on at least one occasion, Poles became participants of barbarism, rounding up and brutally murdering their Jewish neighbors in a pogrom. Jewish perception of the role of Poles in the Shoah often conflicts with the historical record. Both Poles and Jews suffered, albeit disproportionately, at the hands of their Nazi oppressors. With the permission of Nazi officials, Polish residents of Jedwabne, Poland brutally murdered 1,600 of their Jewish neighbors on a hot summer's day in July 1941. Jews were rounded up and humiliated, then were beaten, clubbed or hacked to death; however, most of those who died were eventually herded into a barn and burned alive. This occurrence was extreme and not the norm; however, it occurred and Poles took part in the murder of Jews. Nevertheless, this event has not been examined historically due to the fact that many historians discounted the grim eyewitness testimony of the Jewish survivors of the event as being too incredible to be true.

Jan Gross points clearly to the fact that it appears that journalists and historians have taken “sedatives” and did not address the “mass murder of Jedwabne Jews” for decades believing that the Germans were the only ones who murdered Jews in Poland (Zimmerman, 2003b, p. 77). Furthermore, Gross challenges the status quo of historians of this period and urges them to revise “the approach to sources . . .” arguing that “we must take literally all fragments of information at our disposal” and realize that what the Jewish community truly experienced during the Holocaust “can only be more tragic than the existing representation of events based on surviving evidence” (Zimmerman, 2003b, pp. 78-79).

The Legacy of Anti-Semitism

Salzborn, Brosig, and Schmidt (2011) addressed anti-Semitism and how shifts are occurring in German anti-Semitic attitudes articulated in the German population. Their research considers four sub-dimensions of hatred directed toward Jews in Germany: “(a) the anti-Judaism related to the Christian religion, (b) the biologically argued racial antisemitism, (c) secondary antisemitism, and (d) antisemitism presented as antizionism” (p. 1201). Researchers in this study wanted to understand “the structures, contexts, and dynamics of antisemitism and to focus on aspects of political psychology” and addressed primarily “collective identification, defense, and projection patterns” (p. 1201). They wanted to examine the structure of anti-Semitism beneath its surface in order to “to decipher its political-psychological dynamics, and to elaborate its associative contexts” (p. 1201).

Findings demonstrate that the participants in the study brought up the topic of Judaism on their own accord discussing a broad range of themes ranging from the “Jewish faith, the behavior of Jews in Germany or in international politics or, which is especially surprising considering the given subject, also verbally attacking Israel” (p. 1212). Secondly, participants had no reason to reject Judaism other than their own feelings and influences; they had no real knowledge. Thirdly, participants were not knowledgeable of their own past including family and German history especially in light of National Socialism. “Probably, the most important result of this study, however, is that the results of the empirical social research done in the past with regard to the pervasiveness of antisemitism in Germany will have to be qualified and put into context. To date, quantitative research surveys have assumed a percentage of antisemites in Germany of around 15–20%. According to the results of the study presented here, however, these numbers are too

low” (p. 1214). The authors conclude that “latent antisemitism in Germany is more pronounced than has been ascertained in previous quantitative studies” (p. 1214).

Anti-Semitism and Polish-Jewish Relations

Sulek (2012) addresses in his article the issue of anti-Semitism among Poles by examining sociological, qualitative research conducted over a forty year period (from 1967 to 2010) in which researchers from numerous government and academic investigators examined the Polish population’s view of their relationship with Jews following World War II and the Shoah. The primary purpose of the article was not focused on the long-standing history of Polish Roman Catholics and their Polish Jewish neighbors but on the perception of Polish Jewish relations in the mind of Poles. The author outline “the changes in attitudes [by Poles] towards Jews based precisely upon survey research” (p. 426). The outcome of his analysis points to the fact that Poles have “a general nonacceptance of strangers” but more so have a “specific type of anti-Semitism” (p. 425) throughout their society. Jews have a perceived presence among Poles, who for the most part, are ignorant of the actual numbers of Jews residing in the country. Poles generally have negative emotions towards Jews even though they are barely visible in contemporary Poland. Jews number approximately 20,000 people; however, it is worth noting that prior to the war the Polish Jewish population approached 3.5 million people. Consequently, Poles view Jews symbolically as a “collective entity and a construct of the collective imagination” (p. 425) because Jews are for the most part a lingering mist of a painful albeit distant past.

First of all, Sulek carries forward his argument by pointing to the fact that being unaware of the Jewish presence in Poland could signify that it the question of the Jewish presence is unimportant for the average Pole. Nevertheless he considers that the real problem is “false

knowledge” (p. 427) about the actual Jewish presence in Poland, which may lead to “inflated guesses” (p. 427) about the numbers of Jews and the threat that they represent. The perception that Jews are a threat revolves around the anti-Semitic worldview that “Jews are numerous, stick together, and secretly rule the world” (p. 427). Notwithstanding, this worldview is quite remarkable in light of the fact that Poles are able to assess accurately “the magnitude of the prewar Jewish population and that Poles are “well aware of what happened to this population” (p. 427). In short, Jews live on like a so called “phantom pain” in the collective minds of the people despite the reality of their near total annihilation (p. 428).

Secondly, Sułek looks at the feelings of Poles toward Jews, principally sympathy and antipathy. Antipathy means “a natural, basic, or habitual repugnance; aversion . . . an opposition in feeling . . . or habitual dislike” (Dictionary.com, 2012). Emotions are passed down collectively by the social order and in Poland, he observed that most Poles tended to express “antipathy more than sympathy” (p. 428). Surprisingly, since the collapse of communism the Polish attitude toward Jews have become “mostly positive” (p. 430). Researchers nevertheless concluded when comparing Poland’s attitudes towards Jews with other European countries that the dominant attitude among them all is “ambivalence” (p. 430).

Sułek addresses shifts in the perceived “social distance,” in the third section of his analysis, in which he concludes that the social distance is narrowing and indicates that “feelings about Jews are warming” (p. 431). He identifies factors that are related to social distance such as having Jews as hypothetical neighbors, advising against marrying a Jew, not voting for a Jew, not accepting a blood transfusion from a Jew and that “Jews are our older brothers in the faith” (p. 431). He goes on to point out that these factors of social distance regarding Jews in Poland indicate a “strong component of general distrust towards others” (p. 432) among Poles. When

considering the issue of being a good neighbor, Poles prefer to see themselves “as good neighbors and the Jews as bad ones” (p. 432).

Fourthly, Sułek tackles directly the issue of anti-Semitism and describes it as a way to see and understand the world. Politically speaking anti-Semitism is the belief that “Jews exert a great, inordinate, and undesirable influence” on public institutions and a conviction that Jews “rule the world” (p. 434). He points out that the reason that there is a large degree of anti-Semitism in the Central Europe countries is due to two factors: the homogenous “domination of Catholicism” and “the lack of a tradition of liberal democracy;” Sułek concludes that under such conditions a “culture of tolerance” cannot be created (p. 436).

Sułek ends his analysis with his fifth section in which he surmises that the modern, political form of anti-Semitism is “an obsession focused on ‘Jewish control’” rather than that of the “traditional” religious view (p. 439). Sułek identifies three concepts advanced by Greenwald (1980) as a vocabulary of the collective memory and ego, which are: “egocentricity, beneffectance and cognitive conservatism” (p. 439). Egocentricity concerns the occurrence of a social group remembering the past from their own perspective. Bene-effectance concerns the “collective memory work” that rests upon the “attribution of causal instrumentality” referring to concepts such as good things that happen to you, while bad things that occur to you are “attributed to others/circumstances” (p. 440). The final concept of cognitive conservatism resists “cognitive changes,” which in the case at hand concerns beliefs centering on Polish and Jewish history to be “highly resistant to change” (p. 441). Sułek concludes that the attitudes of Poles towards Jews are shifting in a positive direction which is indicated by an increase in the manifestations of “feelings of closeness” and a decrease in “disapproving cognitive schemes” (p.

425). Changes in the future will rest upon how well Poland rebuilds its national identity and the public discourse concerning “Polish-Jewish relations past and present” (p. 425).

Christian Response to Genocide and the Shoah

Miroslav Volf (2000) of the Yale Divinity School asks: How could Christians in Rwanda “participate in or avert their eyes from . . . genocide” (p. 158) and additionally probes a similar question: “Why are Christians, the presumed agents of peace, at best impotent in the face of their people's conflicts and at worst perpetrators of the most heinous crimes” (p. 159)? He discusses the complicity of Rwandan Christians (Roman Catholics) in the genocide of their neighbors and ponders the “idolatrous shift of loyalty” of the adherents of Christianity in Rwanda. He reasons that Christians should give explicit allegiance and ultimate loyalty to Jesus Christ; however, they do not. He observes that (p. 159):

Many Christians in fact seem to have an overriding commitment to their respective culture, ethnic group, or nation. In conflict situations, they tend to fight on the side of their group and are tempted to employ faith as a weapon in the struggle.

James E. Waller (2007) of Whitworth University examines the institutional church and how it and its agents shape a cultural climate “in which genocidal violence may occur;” it also addresses issues concerning how this culture “responds to such a culture both during and after the genocidal violence” (p. 139). Waller uses cases studies to examine these questions concerning genocide occurring in Christian cultures among which he addresses the Holocaust (Shoah); the Shoah or destruction occurred in Europe where at the time nearly 90% of Europeans considered themselves to be Christians and more so in Germany where “95% of Germans were baptized, taxpaying members of an established Christian church” (p. 140). Waller outlines the “stages of institutional Christian response to genocide” by three stages (pp. 141-149): pre-genocidal responses, genocidal responses and post-genocidal responses. Pre-genocidal responses

are comprised of “the fusion of religious belief systems with ethnic, national, and political identities that provide theological justifications for ‘us-them’ thinking by constricting the churches’ universe of moral obligation” (p. 141). Implications for the institutional church in Christian Germany and Europe were to maintain its status quo position and influence in society. Essentially this meant that the institutional church did not choose “justice” – do the right thing by the Jews, but chose to do what was pragmatic or expedient.

The choice of the institutional church in the run up to the Shoah allowed the Jews to become marginalized and remain “entirely outside the realm of moral obligation for perpetrators” (Waller, 2007, p. 149). Waller concludes that “ultimately, the product of such mythologies and ideologies” define the institutional Christian church culture as being defined by “us” and “them,” which leads to victims being excommunicated and removed “from the perpetrators’ moral universe” (p. 143). According to Sells (as cited in, Waller, 2007, p. 143):

Religions in their ideological manifestations have traditionally been strong at promoting an interior identity in opposition to the religious other than in affirming identity in affirmation of the other.

This type of “moral exclusion” is backed by a theological rationale which can frequently lead to “disastrous consequences,” as Helen Fein notes (as cited in, Waller, 2007, p. 143):

A church holding out the possibility of conversion to all must assume a common humanity, and therefore may not sanction unlimited violence. But a doctrine that assumes people do not belong to a common species knows no limits inhibiting the magnitude of permissible crime.

Genocidal responses are considered to be the “sins of omission (silence and denial) as well as sins of commission (active participation in killings)” (Waller, 2007, p. 141). Considering the “sins of omission” during the Shoah, the institutional church looked out for its own interests principally and its leadership worked to protect “their own institutional autonomy within a totalitarian state. Such interests were best advanced by silence, rather than by protest or heroism”

(p. 144). On the other hand “sins of commission” are demonstrated by the active participation of “individual actors, laity and clergy of Christian institutions” even organizing “the killings.” During the Shoah members of the clergy were found to be members of the Nazi “*Einsatzgruppen* [mobile] killing units,” who carried out mass murder in the killing of Jews (p. 144). Although not mentioned in Waller’s study, in Poland there is evidence of complicity of the Polish Christian population with regards to the death of their Jewish neighbors. It is historically confirmed by Zimmerman (2003a) and Gross (2002) that several pogroms occurred during war and immediately following the war in Poland. The worst of which that occurred during the war took place in the village of Jedwabne in northeast Poland.

Post-genocidal responses represent the “accentuation of the church’s persecution and resistance (marked by the appropriation of the victim groups’ suffering as well as the glorification of individual heroes and martyrs) and official declarations of contrition that avoid direct acknowledgment of institutional guilt” (Waller, 2007, p. 141). Waller cites the story of Corrie ten Boom and her devout Protestant family’s efforts to save 800 Jews during the Shoah. Christian’s also suffered under the persecution of Hitler and Nazi Germany; however, it was disproportionate and collateral to the massive suffering of the Jews. Waller concludes (p. 146):

What matters is the representation of an event, rather than the event itself, and the representation of the Holocaust as an event of Christian suffering to generations of Christian readers is problematic – particularly to Jews, the targeted group of the Nazi extermination policies.

Waller also points to the self-appropriated sufferings of the Roman Catholic Church as a victim during the Shoah following the war; instead of addressing its role “in self-critical analysis of their institutional response (which many have described as complicity) to the Nazi process of destruction, the Vatican’s primary response was to appropriate the Jewish victims’ suffering by taking quick steps to ensure that the Nuremberg Trials also included the persecution of the

Christian church, particularly the Catholic Church in Germany and the Nazi-occupied territories” (p. 146). In conclusion, Waller references David Gushee (as cited in, Waller, 2007, p. 149), who argues that the presence of a Christian church “guarantees nothing” and further states:

The self-identification of people with the Christian faith guarantees nothing. All of the clerical garb and regalia, all of the structures of religious accountability, all of the Christian vocabulary and books, all of the schools and seminaries and parish houses and Bible studies, all of the religious titles and educational degrees – they guarantee nothing”.

Waller closes his paper with three recommendations regarding how Christian institutions might respond differently in the face of genocide (p. 149):

1. The Christian church should not function as an institution in the face of genocide.
2. In the face of genocide like the Shoah, Christians should be able to “learn from the challenge of the *exceptions* of Christian defiance and resistance in the face of mass murder.”
3. The leadership of Jewish and Christian institutions should be function globally in such a way as to “foster interfaith dialogue.”

Summary

The Shoah was a tragic event that deeply impacted the Jewish community. We cannot understand completely why the Shoah occurred but we can see from the above discussion factors that contributed to the Destruction such as the false myth that the Jews killed Jesus, numerous pogroms promulgated against the Jews of Europe and the Middle East, the rise of Islam and the division of Christendom all of which led to an elemental form of Jewish hatred and the antecedents of modern anti-Semitism. Modern expressions of anti-Semitism primarily espouse the exclusion of Jews from mainstream society because they are foreigners or others. Political ideologists such as Karl Marx saw them as agents of capitalism and for this reason to be overthrown. The theory of Social Darwinism theorized the survival of the strongest while linguistic researchers concluded that Jews “were egotistical and exclusive,” while Indo-Europeans “were tolerant and altruistic” due to the fact that their “languages stemmed from a

common origin” (Bauer, 2001, p. 50). These streams converged in Wagner, who glorified German paganism and popular German literature prior to World War II, which presented stereotypes and caricatures of Jews. Ultimately these modern expressions of anti-Semitism found their way into official Nazi ideology and policy leading to the events of the Shoah.

The Reconstruction

Remembering is important. Memory work is not cost-free, especially when we talk about mutually experienced trauma and collectively enacted wrongdoing, as in the Shoah. Judith Lewis Herman (as cited in Krondorfer, 2012, p. 308) writes that “remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims.” I see a connection between her words and the Shoah, as it is one of the greatest tragic, moral and ethical failures in the history of humanity. I believe that remembering leads to action through dealing with the damage brought on by oppressors. This concept in its simplest form is restoration; nonetheless, I think that the scars from such a trauma as the Shoah still remain. The Nazi occupation of Poland is unique morally and ethically. Some Poles acted to preserve Jewish life, while some were less noble and others betrayed the Jews into the hands of the Nazis. Jews are not without guilt as some Jews acted to preserve their own lives and sold out other Jews. Both Polish Catholics and Polish Jews see themselves as victims; however they suffered disproportionately.

My experience has taught me, as a Baptist pastor working in Poland and now as a leader of an institution established by a group of Christians that it is important to recognize the tragedy of the Shoah and how Christians did not act justly and intervene on behalf of their Jewish neighbors. I have said to the Chief Rabbi of Poland, Rabbi Michael Schudrich, on several

occasions that I/we are standing with you, alongside of you today speaking to the injustice of the Shoah. We remember and honor the lives of those who perished.

As noted in the previous section (pp. 45- 48), Waller (2007) raises issues that are relevant for me to consider as a leader of a Christian non-profit organization, TMF. We should not seek to preserve our own well-being but act in such a way to do what is right by the Jewish community today. It is for this reason that we act and care for and restore Jewish cemeteries in Poland. By our willingness and actions to swim against the flow as a group of Christians, we have entered into a dialogue with the global Jewish community of Jewish descent. This dialogue is difficult and filled with tension. It is my hope that G-d may grant us continued favor as we seek to recognize justice and mercifully love others as we serve both the Polish and Polish-Jewish community.

Tragic History of Mutual Exclusion

It is difficult to grasp the complex and at times tragic history of Jews in Poland. Jewish history in Poland is more than just the history of the Shoah. Jewish history in Poland is lengthy and rich, frequently characterized by both good and strained relations between Jew and Christian. It is important to realize that in Poland, Jews found a haven, a sanctuary in which to flourish and live their lives for more than 800 years. Jews were free to be Jews for the most part in Poland, becoming “significant, highly visible and not entirely powerless minority” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 12). In sheer terms of numbers, Poland for centuries was the home to “the largest Jewish population of any country in the world,” with the Jewish population comprising “between ten and thirteen percent of the total population” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 12).

According to Hoffman (2000), Polish Jewish history is “one of the longest examples of cross-ethnic and cross-religious coexistence, relevant not only for Jewish self-understanding, but

to our broader contemporary situation” (p. 12). As such, Hoffman (2000) views Polish-Jewish interaction as “a kind of extended experiment in multiculturalism” and believes “that some of the conflicts in Polish-Jewish history can be seen in terms of majority-minority tensions, rather than in terms of strong and specific anti-Semitism” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 12). Mutual exclusion or “separateness” along with the inability “to create a common sphere of interests and concerns” seem to be major factors that impacted interaction between Jews and Christian Poles – Poles did not want to include Jews fully, while the majority of Jews desired to keep on being separate and maintain their identity as a “nation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 17).

I believe, as Hoffman infers, that instead of mutual exclusion, Jew and Christian should work toward inclusion focusing upon the creation of a mutual “sphere of interests and concerns.” I term this sphere of interaction, building a bridge of mercy – mercy based on the Jewish understanding of *chesed shel-emet*, “true loving-kindness” along with *gemilut chasadim*, “the giving of loving-kindness.” It is through this bridge of mercy that we might join each other in committing acts of kindness that lead toward breaking the cycle of evil, forgiveness, dialogue and ultimately reconciliation.

Defining Justice

We learn from Telushkin (2006) that the prophet Micah teaches us that “God’s primary demand of human beings is to act righteously [or justly]” (p. 14). Telushkin expounds and says that G-d does not require from us sacrifices or religious rituals; “rather, God’s most significant demands are justice, compassion, and humility” (p. 14). What is justice? Justice (Dictionary.com, n.d.) is:

1. The quality of being fair and reasonable.
2. The quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, or moral rightness: *to uphold the justice of a cause.*

3. The principle or ideal of just dealing or right action. Conformity to this principle or ideal: righteousness.

The Torah teaches us that justice is focused upon our actions toward others. According to Telushkin (2001) the Hebrew word *zedaka* is literally translated as justice or righteousness and “it is usually translated, somewhat inaccurately as charity” (p. 573). He elaborates further by stating that acting justly “is perhaps the most important obligation Judaism imposes on the Jew” (p. 573). The Torah admonishes us in Deuteronomy 16:20 to pursue justice: “Justice (*zedek*), justice you shall pursue.” Later we learn from the Talmud: “*Tzedaka* is equal to all the other commandments combined (Bava Bathra 9b)” (as cited in, Telushkin, 2001, p. 573). The giving of *zedaka* is viewed in Judaism as acting justly. By extension justice means that we are to be fair in how we deal with other people. We are not lie, cheat or steal. Additionally the Torah (Deuteronomy 16:18-20) instructs:

Appoint judges and officials for each of your tribes in every town the Lord your God is giving you, and they shall judge the people fairly. Do not pervert justice or show partiality. Do not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and twists the words of the righteous. Follow justice and justice alone, so that you may live and possess the land the Lord your God is giving you.

If we seek justice, we help others, the oppressed and care for orphans and widows. In writings of the Prophet Isaiah 1:16b-17, we hear the admonition to Israel: “Stop doing wrong, learn to do right! Seek justice, encourage the oppressed. Defend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow.” The Bible characterizes God as just and righteous and connects these attributes to his mercy. He is just (righteous) and acts mercifully on our behalf. Once more in Isaiah 56:1, we read: “This is what the Lord says: ‘Maintain justice and do what is right, for my salvation is close at hand and my righteousness will soon be revealed.’” The Prophet Jeremiah proclaims in Jeremiah 9:23-24 that God delights in mercy, justice, and righteousness. We see:

Let not the wise man boast of his wisdom or the strong man boast of his strength or the rich man boast of his riches, but let him who boasts boast about this: that he understands and knows me, that I am the Lord, who exercises kindness (or loving-kindness), justice and righteousness on earth, for in these I delight, declares the Lord.

We also perceive in Hosea 6:6 that God is not pleased by sacrifices but kindness, “For I desire mercy (kindness), not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of God rather than burnt offerings.”

Justice Mitigated by Love

Du Preez (1985) discusses in his article G-d’s concern for those treated unjustly. By doing what is right toward one’s neighbor, the love, the loving-kindness of G-d is revealed. According to D. J. Bosch (as cited in, Du Preez, 1985, pp. 45-46), we learn that justice is central to the gospel of Matthew, which illustrates the fact that the G-d of love is the G-d of justice or right. DuPreez connects these two dimensions of G-d to each other forming a concept he describes as “*justice-love*” and links it to the kingdom of G-d. He believes that this construct is valid in both the Old and New Testaments. The Bible reveals G-d, as the G-d of love, who is also the G-d of righteous and justice and as Scott (1984) indicates this G-d, “is concerned about social justice, not mere private morality” (as cited in, Du Preez, 1985, p. 38). Arthur F. Glasser (1983) echoes this point of view and concludes that G-d, “is strongly moved by the cries of the oppressed, particularly when his people collectively make no effort to relieve their anguish” (as cited in, Du Preez, 1985, p. 38). The relevance of these two statements is that the people of G-d are to be not just morally upright but they are to be compassionate and to show concern for their neighbors – those around them oppressed by injustice.

Jesus summarized the Torah (the Law) into two basic statements: love of G-d and love of neighbor and declared that the entirety of the Law and the Prophets rest on these two commandments (Matt. 22:40). Jesus does not merely have in view for those who follow him

simply to obey a series of “moral or ceremonial rules;” obviously he is being “quite concrete” and stating that loving G-d is “revealed in doing what is right towards one's neighbour (sic)” (Du Preez, 1985, p. 45). Doing what is right because of love for neighbor is what DuPreez equates with his concept of justice-love. The justice that Jesus has in view is clarified further in the so called “Sermon on the Mount” (found in Matthew 5:21-47). In his teaching Jesus illuminates the concept of G-d’s justice “in terms of a number of pithy contrasts in which the keyword is *love* that wishes to do right to one's neighbour (sic),” which by so doing demonstrates “love towards the hostile fellow-man, through which the pupil of the kingdom of God would be ‘perfect’ as his heavenly Father is perfect” (Du Preez, 1985, p. 45). In other words, this type of justice and love would reveal the character of G-d in a person.

The Continuum of Jewish-Christian Dialogue

When I began my journey toward reconciliation with the Jewish community, I had no idea as to how to go about interacting with a Jew. Therefore, I approached everything that I did with sensitivity, caution and humility. I have learned much experientially over the past ten years regarding my interaction with the Jewish community. Two years ago, I began to the question of how to best go about interacting or dialoguing with the Jewish community. First of all, I must address the question: “What is the nature of Jewish-Christian dialogue?” In brief, I have encountered primarily three distinct perspectives held by religious Jews toward dialogue with Christians: no dialogue, limited dialogue and full dialogue.

No Dialogue

The Orthodox Jewish community has been strongly influenced by the Torah and by past experience including the Shoah. Consequently the Jewish community in principle does not wish

or see the need to interact with the Christian community. Their rationale is based upon the teaching of the Torah (for example, Numbers 23:9) and their perception that the Shoah was perpetrated by Christians. Important Jewish Orthodox theologians “see a connection between Christianity and the Nazi ideology that created the Shoah” (Porton, 2012). Eliezer Berkovits, an Orthodox rabbi, stated that Christianity enabled the Nazis to execute the Shoah. He argued, "Without the contempt and hatred for the Jews planted by Christianity in the hearts of the multitude of its followers, Nazism's crime against the Jewish people could never have been conceived, much less executed" (Porton, 2012).

Richard L. Rubenstein, a Conservative rabbi, believes that Christians perpetrated a false image, a "mythological Jew," which “provided the images and the models for the Nazis” to use in desensitizing the German population to Jews who then became more and more seen “as the devil's surrogates, God-killers” producing “fertile ground for Nazi propaganda” (Porton, 2012). Rabbi Raymond Apple summarizes the Orthodox theological positions regarding Jewish-Christian interaction in this manner: “Somewhere in the consciousness of most Jews would be an equation like this: gentiles = persecutors: just leave us alone and don’t talk of dialogues. ‘Give us neither your honey nor your sting’ (Numbers 20:10)” (Apple, 2010, para. 13).

Post-Shoah developments in Jewish-Christian relations over the latter half of the Twentieth Century have mitigated to some degree Jewish views of Christianity and its role in the Shoah. In his article, *Jewish-Christian Relations*, Michael Kress (2012) maintains that the interaction between Jews and Christians is improving primarily because Christians have completely re-evaluated their “attitude toward Jews and Judaism,” which has revolutionized the relationship between these two religious groups. Kress further emphasizes that even though differences remain between them, contemporary Jews may reasonably expect for the first time in

history “that these differences will be addressed through interfaith dialogue rather than the violence of the past.” Moreover Kress points out that during the Shoah, Christians played the role of “rescuers – people whose faith led them to risk their lives by hiding or otherwise saving Jews.” The brave acts of these Christians do indeed provide a significant connection between Jew and Christian; “however, the role of Christians and Christianity in perpetuating the Shoah remains a point of contention between the two religions.”

Limited Dialogue

The second Jewish perspective of dialogue regarding Jewish-Christian relations emerges in the framework of a post-Shoah world in which dialogue is limited; nonetheless dialogue is possible albeit strained due to Jewish perceptions toward Christians and their role in the Shoah. In his paper Dr. Michael Wyschogrod (1986) outlines historical developments in Jewish-Christian interaction prior to and following the Second World War and states that Modern Orthodoxy, centered around Yeshiva University, “does not reject all dialogue with Christian organizations, only theological dialogue” and dialogue may occur that is centered on “social and ethical issues such as poverty, war,” as well as issues related to “justice and international relations” (Wyschogrod, 1986, para. 5). However, religious or theological dialogue is not permissible. The rationale for this position is justified by a journal article written by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik titled: *Confrontation*.

Soloveitchik (as cited in Wyschogrod, 1986, para. 10) postulates that Jews have always been part of humanity and are for this reason “committed to the general welfare and progress of mankind,” desiring to combat disease and “in alleviating human suffering, in protecting man's rights, in helping the needy, etcetera.” Dialogue therefore is permissible and limited for theological reasons, which Soloveitchik (as cited in Wyschogrod, 1986, para. 11) views faith as

reflecting “the intimate, the private, the paradoxically inexpressible cravings of the individual for and his linking up with the Maker.” Ultimately Wyschogrod (1986) concludes that Soloveitchik’s postulates “have not prevented theological dialogue” (para. 17) with Christians, stating that “Jews who meet religious Christians emerge strengthened in their faith and grateful for the righteous gentiles who, through Christianity, have approached the God of Israel” (para. 21).

Soloveitchik’s Construct of Confrontation

Soloveitchik (an Orthodox Rabbi) argues for “confrontation” in that we as human beings have been placed on this earth and thereby should or have the responsibility to “confront the world around us” (p. 213). Through confronting the world around us human beings develop and “enables us to rise to our potential” much as Adam confronts the natural world in order to “control and master this world” (p. 213). Accordingly the man confronted with difficulty must rely on the resources within his reach as a means to overcome this world. In a similar manner men and women must confront each other, which for Soloveitchik occurs within “the covenant or faith community” (p. 214). What this means for the Jew that he or she confronts common issues that impact society (common good) but not on a theological level. In other words Soloveitchik postulates that Jewish-Christian dialogue may occur within the context of the arena for the common good of “secular humanity” concerning “all fields of constructive human endeavor” (as cited in, Rashkover, 2000, p. 214).

According to Rashkover, Novak contradicts Soloveitchik position by pointing out that “neither Jew nor Christian can interchangeably assume a faith-position and then a nonfaith position” (p. 215). His conclusion is that such a dialogue between Jew and Christian cannot be genuine by limiting it to the “secular realm” (p. 215). Novak proposes two conditions in order for Jewish-Christian dialogue to occur (p. 215):

1. It must flow from “the believers’ respective theological belief systems.”
2. As with Soloveitchik, Novak believes that the dialogue must be limited and avoid discussing “either tradition’s particular experience of revelation.”

Both groups have a common understanding of Creation before the revelation occurred “spoken by God to particular communities” (p. 216).

Full Dialogue

Wyschogrod’s conclusion leads to the third Jewish perspective regarding Jewish-Christian dialogue. Kress (2012) points out that Jews “have not ignored the changes in Christianity” and in 2000 a group of “Jewish rabbinic and academic leaders issued a statement called *Dabru Emet*,” meaning “Speak the Truth” (para. 8). In *Dabru Emet* the group recognized the work of the Christian “to improve interfaith relations and called on Jews to learn about and likewise affirm the positive changes” (para. 8). *Dabru Emet* is a vital statement in Jewish-Christian relations; it makes eight statements upon which “Jews and Christians could base dialogue” (para. 8). Below, please find the list (“*Dabru Emet: A Jewish statement on Christians and Christianity*,” 2000):

1. Jews and Christians worship the same G-d.
2. Jews and Christians seek authority from the same book — the Bible (what Jews call “Tanakh” and Christians call the “Old Testament”).
3. Christians can respect the claim of the Jewish people upon the land of Israel.
4. Jews and Christians accept the moral principles of Torah.
5. Nazism was not a Christian phenomenon.
6. The humanly irreconcilable difference between Jews and Christians will not be settled until G-d redeems the entire world as promised in Scripture.
7. A new relationship between Jews and Christians will not weaken Jewish practice.
8. Jews and Christians must work together for justice and peace.

Liminal Space

Halina Birenbaum, a survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto and the Shoah, wrote that when she was interned at Majdanek, she volunteered along with other women to weed the grass between

the electrified fences that encompassed and divided the Nazi concentration and death camp. She said of her experience (Birenbaum, 1996, pp. 88-89),

[No guard, overseer or *Capo*] dared come between these wires, so no one urged us on, or struck or rushed us. We could sit and rest, picking at the weeds and grass. I preferred this work to any other. Here I had the peace that I longed for.

Much like Halina, I find myself “between . . . wires” – in the middle space; however, I am not between such electrified fences in a death camp. I am between the Jew and the Gentile-Christian.

Liminality is a concept that describes being between or in the middle of two spaces, literally in-between the two; it is like the front porch of a house, which separates the home from the front yard or the street. Franks and Meteyard (2007) state that liminality is derived from the Latin word for threshold; it is “the state of being betwixt and between where the old world has been left behind but we have not yet arrived at what is to come” (p. 215). The authors consider Richard Rohr’s suggestion that the only escape for a person entrapped in “normalcy, the way things are,” is to enter into a “sacred space,” frequently termed *liminality* (from the Latin *limen*), where it is possible to encounter “genuine transformation” (as cited in, Franks & Meteyard, 2007, p. 215).

Andrea Ciccarelli (2012) of Indiana University, views the idea of liminal space as a barrier or border and addresses the border at the level of “cultural, linguistic, philosophical and existential” elements (p. 342). Ciccarelli’s focus is on “the image of the border as a barrier and a bridge, and on the poetics of ‘the other side’” (p. 342); she considers liminal space as a position in which people face “a perennial border, with its intuitive and unconscious representation of the *other*” (p. 347). The concept of the other or being a foreigner in a new situation places people out of sorts with their new space. Nic Beech (2011) of University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom, considers identity construction and identity change (or change process) in terms of an

individual moving from one identity to another from an individual “self-identity” to a “social-identity” (p. 285). Furthermore, Beech reasons that social contexts “frame the possibilities that people have for creating and recognizing meaning in their interactions” (p. 290). I take this to mean that people choose how they interpret their interactions with other people in the social construct and daily narrative of life.

Moloney (2011) conducts a qualitative case study utilizing organic inquiry piloted among Australian women. Major focus was the treatment of focus groups as transformative space for spiritual encounters (liminal space as seen in terms of a focus group). Moloney concludes that the focus group is a “sacred container” that possibly signifies “the hope that as human nature evolves it can transform itself into its greater spiritual potential” (p. 71). She introduced me to the value of focus groups in qualitative research and how I might employ them as liminal space in which Jews and Christians might interact dialoguing more freely about critical issues confronting them. Focus groups allow people to explore “the construction and negotiation of meanings” (p. 58). Also I became aware of the methodology of organic inquiry which may be a valuable tool for me to explore issues of spirituality among Jews and Christians allowing them to share deeply what troubles them in their souls – not for the purpose of conversion but for the purpose of dialogue and understanding.

Leslie Sharpe (2006) examines the “shifting or indeterminate kind of public space – liminal spaces, haunted space, and spaces and zones that are often 'misread' by locative technologies - referred to here as 'grey zones'” (p. 1). She defines these so-called “grey zones” as spaces or places of alterity (being other or different). These spaces “could be Michel Foucault's 'heterotopias', or Marc Augé's 'non-places', or Edward Soja's 'thirdspace'” (p. 1). In such a space, “there is another aspect of non-place implied here: the place of border-crossing. This is a place

of longing – particularly the longing to cross into that space that is beyond the edge of the horizon” (p. 2).

Although Auton-Cuff and Gruenhage (2014) focus their attention on educational issues, I believe the authors’ treatment of liminality presents a theoretical construct as a lens to conduct their study. I am looking for a similar theoretical lens or construct by which to conduct my future research. I could not find any research associated with Jewish Christian dialogue and the concept of liminality. My understanding of what I am doing in my work is that I have constructed a liminal space through the work of the non-profit foundation that I lead in which Jew and Christian may interact. One of the conclusions that the Auton-Cuff and Gruenhage make is: “When we live and work within a liminal space, change is very possible” (p. 6). I resonate with their conclusion because I see the possibility of changing perceptions and the possibility of opening a deeper dialogue between the Jewish and Christian communities.

Martin Buber Theory of Dialogue

In contemporary American society religious pluralism unquestionably is an integral part of daily life. By nature therefore America is comprised of diverse religious groups creating, as President Barak Obama declared in his 2009 inaugural address, a “patchwork heritage” of religious diversity, which he stated was “a strength, not a weakness” and asserted that “we are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus – and non-believers” (Obama, 2009). Shady and Larson (2010) ask a series of questions: How do educators deal with the challenges that religious diversity presents in the classroom? What will it take for teachers to prepare their pupils to engage in the discourse regarding “competing religious truths? Should tolerance be our final goal, or is a deeper sense of mutual understanding possible” (p. 81)?

Tippett (2007) asked, “It is possible to be a believer and a listener at the same time, to be both fervent and searching, to nurture a vital identity and to wonder at the identities of others?” Shady and Larson (2010) pick up on this statement and juxtapose it with the question: “How do I balance my own belief commitments with my responsibility to be genuinely open to and challenged by the other’s perspective” (p. 82)? They consider this question in their paper as a means “to explore how we can help our students (and ourselves)” understand issues related to religious diversity in the classroom in terms of “proper intellectual boundaries” (p. 82). Furthermore they postulate in their paper that Martin Buber’s work concerning difference in religion, “holds fruitful answers to the challenging questions of diversity in the twenty-first century” (p. 82).

Shady and Larson (2010) describe the “process of dialogue,” which allows someone to come to understand the position of another person, “while at the same time remaining rooted” in their own personal point of view. Additionally they point out that Buber maintained that inclusion connects both the “interpersonal boundaries with the intellectual boundaries” (Shady & Larson, 2010, p. 82) and he considered “the relation in education is one of pure dialogue” (Buber, 1957, p. 98). In essence what Buber’s model does is to advocate “a shared reality where all partners in the dialogue come to understand each other’s position, even if they do not entirely agree with it” (Shady & Larson, 2010, p. 83). The authors go on to explain components and philosophies of Buber’s educational theory, identifying what Buber termed, “Between.” Between is an “ontological category where the ‘meeting’ occurs,” which Buber defined as “the narrow ridge between subjective and objective;” it is at this point that true inclusion occurs and “genuine dialogue” begins (Shady & Larson, 2010, pp. 84-85).

Consequently, Shady and Larson (2010) dismiss the educational practices of tolerance and empathy as being inadequate methods of dealing with religious diversity in the classroom. As an alternative they consider Buber's concept of inclusion, which "seeks to break down boundaries and develop deep relations with other people and with things that others have created" (p. 88). Furthermore, Shady and Larson (2010) argue that an exclusive approach of education advances knowledge and intellectual development as it does not promote inclusiveness through a dialogue or an exchange of ideas regarding a particular subject; "learning is both cognitive and affective, involving the whole person" (p. 90). The authors advance several examples of what educational inclusion might look like and for example, consider Karen Armstrong (a British historian and theologian) and how her views education are similar to Buber's:

"She [Armstrong] shows that education is not merely cognitive but is also necessarily affective and even spiritual. She shows that inclusion is marked by a willingness to open oneself to new ideas and perspectives – perhaps even being changed by them – but doing so without losing sight of oneself" (Shady & Larson, 2010, p. 92).

Breaking the Cycle of Evil

I believe that breaking the cycle of evil rests in doing a loving act that will lead to forgiveness and reconciliation. Enright and other researchers give a four part model to assist "people forgive" (as cited in, Johnson, 2012, p. 130). I believe that their model is a helpful construct. I would modify it in the following way:

1. "Bringing back to memory" (*uncovering*). It is important to remember the past and bring back to memory the history, heritage and culture of the Jewish people and the thousand year role that they have played in Polish and Jewish history.
2. Restoring (*decision*). By restoring Jewish cemeteries TMF honors the past and impacts the present. As Christians we decide to deal with the painful past of the Holocaust today seeking to bring Jew and Christian together in a common mitzvah to care for and restore Jewish cemeteries.

3. Reconciling (*absorbing pain*). In a sense TMF becomes intercessors between Polish Jews – Jews of Polish descent and Poles. Even though Poles were not the initiators of the Holocaust, they were neighbors, who were oftentimes anti-Semitic, ambivalent or unable to help their Jewish neighbors. Understanding this complex situation is not easy; however, I find myself increasingly going to a place of suffering and "absorbing" the pain of the Holocaust.

Enright postulates that by absorbing suffering, “the forgiver decides to endure suffering, rather than pass it on thereby breaking the cycle of evil” and when considered in this manner “forgiveness is a gift of mercy to the wrongdoer” (as cited in, Johnson, 2012, p. 130). I am convinced that as we bring mercy (caring acts through restoration of Jewish cemeteries) we display God's love, which allows forgiveness to emerge. I have not yet seen forgiveness expressed on a large scale by Polish Jews to their neighbors or to the Germans, I have seen personally how I have entered into this dialogue as Christian. I have been asked many times, “Why would you a Christian, do this for us as Jews?” My answer is simply love.

Summary, Implications and Discussion

The premise of what I call “the reconstruction” is basically remembering the Shoah. Remembering leads to action through dealing with the damage brought on by oppressors. This concept in its simplest form is restoration. Restoration brings healing and hope by acting in such a way to do what is right by the Jewish community today. This is my task as the leader of TMF and my purpose as a follower of Christ. Hoffman views the primary difficulty between Polish Catholic and Jew is that of mutual exclusion. Coupled with the inability “to create a common sphere of interests and concerns” both aspects appear to be major factors that impacted interaction between Jews and Christian Poles – Poles did not want to include Jews fully, while the majority of Jews desired to keep on being separate and maintain their identity as a “nation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 17). I believe, as Hoffman infers, that instead of mutual exclusion, Jew and

Christian should work toward inclusion focusing upon the creation of a mutual “sphere of interests and concerns.” I term this sphere of interaction, building a bridge of mercy – mercy based on the Jewish understanding of *chesed shel-emet*, “true loving-kindness” along with *gemilut chasadim*, “the giving of loving-kindness.”

The Torah admonishes us in Deuteronomy 16:20 to pursue justice: “Justice (*tzedek*), justice you shall pursue.” Justice is to be mitigated by love, which means that the people of G-d are to be not just or morally upright but they are to be compassionate and to show concern for their neighbors – those around them oppressed by injustice. The nature of Jewish-Christian dialogue is complex and at times difficult; it is influenced by distinct theological differences, history and racism, all of which cannot be ignored and must be addressed. The continuum of Jewish Christian dialogue ranges from the non-existent dialogue, to limited and finally to full dialogue within the construct of *Dabru Emet* (speak truth). I am not seeking to open an inter-faith dialogue with the Jewish community; although quite invaluable, it is beyond the scope of my work. Instead, as a servant who leads, a public charity, I am attempting to broaden and deepen the dialogue that I already have with the Jewish community so that TMF may effectively realize its two-fold mission: to educate the public about the Shoah and to care for and restore Jewish cemeteries in Poland.

Like Halina, I find myself in the middle space; however, I am not between the electrified fences. I am between the Jew and the Gentile-Christian. I have come to understand that neither group understands me. I live between two cultures, a third culture, but I am neither. I see myself as a hybrid. I have elements of both within me. Sometimes, I am misunderstood, so I work to understand and reconcile the two. I am learning about myself and who I am. I am also learning about the work of reconciliation through remembering the Shoah and its victims by caring and

leading others to restore Jewish cemeteries in Poland. I do not have an answer regarding how this is all to work out because what I am doing is emerging and unfixed. However, I find peace in what I am doing. And even in the most difficult of circumstances that I find myself in leading a Christian non-profit working with the Polish Jewish community, I persevere because, I have learned to remember that G-d is with me as I walk humbly with him.

Three Lessons Learned

Upon reflection, I have learned through my work and research at least three lasting lessons (as cited in, Reece, 2012, pp. 10-11):

1. You must locate the cliffs of injustice.
2. Build bridges of mercy.
3. Travel the road of dialogue.

Locate the Cliffs of Injustice

Find the cliffs of injustice where justice was cheated, clubbed, and killed. Where is the wound of the people? You locate the cliffs of injustice, by listening to the stories of wrongs. In Poland, Roman Catholic Poles and Jewish Poles still feel the currents of the river of rage. On a cool summer afternoon, I took a group of friends to the place in Warsaw where the bridge that connected the two Ghettos was built. While explaining what happened here, an elderly Polish woman approached and asked me in Polish, “What are you doing?” I replied in Polish, “I am telling them about the bridge that was once here on this corner.” She began to tell me how difficult the war was for Catholic Poles: How if they tried to help a Jew in any way, in any area, they and their entire families came under a sentence of death. Then she said strongly to me, “You tell them that we had no choice.” Injustice kills choices. Injustice carves cliffs. And the cliffs of injustice stare out over the vast rivers of rage.

Build the Bridge of Mercy

Deeds of loving kindness lay the bridge of mercy. The bridge of mercy allows us to connect with the people who have suffered the injustice. It allows us to be invited to that table of dialogue. It allows us to tell each other who we are. And when you do the deeds of mercy, others will say to you what one Polish woman said to me, “I am listening. Your words are not rushing past my ears.” Your words will slow down and walk. Your words will sit at the table of memory. Others see. Others hear. And your deed-words will not rush past their ears.

Travel the Road of Dialogue

Once you locate the gaping wounds injustice, you get a sense of how to build the bridge of mercy. And when the bridge of mercy is constructed, you can begin to travel along the road of dialogue. It is a road always under construction. Alek Wasowicz lives in Warsaw, Poland and works with the Rabbinical Commission for Matters of [Jewish] Cemeteries. I began this journey with him. When I left Poland in 2008, Alek said to me, “In this global world, I do not see why you cannot continue your work from America. You must continue, because you have entered the most difficult dialogue in the world.” The way of dialogue may be difficult. But that road is paved with *matzevahs* – stones of memory. And along the neglected roads to Polish Jewish cemeteries, my friends and I are sharing common times of deeply remembering, practically restoring, and wonderfully reconciling.

Conclusion

We are responsible to deal with evil and its aftermath. One difficult issue that I have encountered in my work of caring for and restoring Jewish cemeteries in Poland is indifference. It is not an “indifference to evil” that Heschel has in mind; nevertheless, it is apathy or a lack of

concern. I find indifference among Jews of Polish origins and Christians. To the Jew caring for the dead, which includes caring for a cemetery, is not optional. To do so is to obey the Torah and by so doing fulfill what is known as a mitzvah. According to Rabbi Heschel (as cited in Eckstein, 1984, p. 66), “the central issue in Judaism is the mitzvah, the sacred act.” So, Heschel is saying that “the task of man is to be a voice” for those who have no voice. The Jews who were exterminated during the Shoah have no voice, so where is the concern?

The Jewish Prophets, such as Micah and Hosea spoke about to the issue of mercy – literally the concern for others. The person of Jesus Christ, a Jewish rabbi, also unquestionably spoke to the importance of mercy. Jesus taught that keeping the Torah is important; however, he emphasized that observing it should be done without “neglecting the more important matters of the Law: justice, mercy and faithfulness” (Matthew 23:23). Jesus also pointed to what the Prophet Hosea (Hoshea) wrote of G-d, “For I desire mercy (loving-kindness), not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of G-d rather than burnt offerings (Hosea 6:6).” What I see here is a connection between memory and concern; in my mind these two concepts are insuperably linked to each other. I cannot be a bystander when I see or recall an injustice; I must act compassionately.

I believe that Jews and Christians can come to terms with the past pain brought about by the Shoah by dealing with its evil through “loving acts.” Forgiveness may emerge leading to dialogue and possibly reconciliation. My dissertation will explore mercy as the language of dialogue and the organization that I lead, The Matzevah Foundation will illustrate that dialogue.

References

- Apple, R. (2010). Christian-Jewish relations: A Jewish perspective. Retrieved December 9, 2013, from http://www.jcrelations.net/Christian-Jewish_Relations_A_Jewish_Perspective.2240.0.html?
- Ash, T. G. (2009). As at Auschwitz, the gates of Hell are built and torn down by human hearts. Retrieved from The Guardian website: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/23/poland-catholicism-nazis-difficult-past>
- Auton-Cuff, F., & Gruenhage, J. (2014). *Stories of persistence: The liminal journey of first generation university graduates*. Paper presented at the Higher Education Close Up 7, Research Making a Difference, Lancaster University, UK, July 2014.
- Axel, L. E. (1979). Christian theology and the murder of Jews. *Encounter*, 40(2), 129-141.
- Bauer, Y. K. N. (2001). *A history of the Holocaust* (Rev. ed.). New York: Franklin Watts.
- Beech, N. (2011). Liminality and the practices of identity reconstruction. *Human Relations*, 64(2), 285-302. doi: 10.1177/0018726710371235
- Birenbaum, H. (1996). *Hope is the last to die: A coming of age under Nazi terror* (pp. xi, 227 p.). Retrieved from WorldCat database Retrieved from <http://books.google.com/books?id=A7V54U6w8KEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>
- Bond, M. H., Leung, K., Au, A., Tong, K.-K., de Carrasquel, S. R., Murakami, F., . . . Lewis, J. R. (2004). Culture-level dimensions of social axioms and their correlates across 41 cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35(5), 548-570. doi: 10.1177/0022022104268388
- Buber, M. (1957). *Pointing the way* (M. Friedman, Trans. M. Friedman Ed.). New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Ciccarelli, A. (2012). Crossing borders: Claudio Magris and the aesthetic of the other side. *Journal of European Studies*, 42(4), 342-361. doi: 10.1177/0047244112460001
- Dabru Emet: A Jewish statement on Christians and Christianity. (2000). Retrieved December 9, 2013, from <http://www.icjs.org/dabru-emet/text-version>
- Delcau, S. F. (2012). The power of tzedakah. In A. F. o. M. D. Adom (Ed.). Internet: American Friends of Magen David Adom.
- Dictionary.com. (2012). Antipathy. Retrieved 09/28/2012, 2012, from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/antipathy>

- Dictionary.com. (n.d.). Justice. Retrieved December 6, 2014, from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/justice>
- Dover, K. J. (1980). *Plato: Symposium*. Cambridge, [Eng.]: New York.
- Du Preez, J. (1985). Social justice: Motive for the mission of the Church. *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*(53), 36-46.
- Eckstein, Y. (1984). *What Christians should know about Jews and Judaism*. Waco, TX: Word.
- Ferrari, G. R. F. (1987). *Listening to the cicadas: A study of Plato's Phaedrus*: New York.
- Franks, A., & Meteyard, J. (2007). Liminality: The transforming grace of in-between places. *The Journal Of Pastoral Care & Counseling: JPCC*, 61(3), 215-222.
- Gross, J. T. (2002). *Neighbors: The destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne, Poland*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Hoffman, E. (2000). Complex histories, contested memories: Some reflections on remembering difficult pasts. *Occasional Papers of the Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities*, 23, 32.
- Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1988). *The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to economic growth*.
- House, R., Javidan, M., Hanges, P., & Dorfman, P. (2002). Understanding cultures and implicit leadership theories across the globe: An introduction to project GLOBE. *Journal of World Business*, 37(1), 3-10. doi: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9516\(01\)00069-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9516(01)00069-4)
- House, R. J. (2004). *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Hyman, R. T. (2005). Questions and response in Micah 6:6-8. *Jewish Bible Quarterly*, 33(3), 157-165.
- Javidan, M., & Dastmalchian, A. (2009). Managerial implications of the GLOBE project: A study of 62 societies. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 47(1), 41-58. doi: 10.1177/1038411108099289
- Johnson, C. E. (2012). *Meeting the ethical challenges of leadership: Casting light or shadow*. United States of America: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Kabaskal, H., & Bodur, M. (2004). Humane orientation in societies, organizations and leader attributes. In R. J. House (Ed.), *Culture, leadership and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies* (pp. 564-601). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Kampf, A. (2013). Tales of healthy men: Male reproductive bodies in biomedicine from 'Lebensborn' to sperm banks. *Health*., 17(1), 20-36. doi: 10.1177/1363459312447251

- Kluckhohn, F. R., & Strodtbeck, F. L. (1961). *Variations in value orientations*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
- Kress, M. (2012). Jewish-Christian relations. Retrieved December 11, 2012, from http://www.myjewishlearning.com/history/Jewish_World_Today/Jews_and_Non-Jews/Jewish-Christians_Relations.shtml
- Krondorfer, B. (2012). The art of dialogue: Jewish-Christian relations in a post-Shoah world (The Jerome Cardin Memorial Lecture). *Cross Currents*, 62(3), 301-317. doi: 10.1111/j.1939-3881.2012.00242.x
- Krysińska, K., & Lester, D. (2006). The contribution of psychology to the study of the Holocaust. *Dialogue & Universalism*, 16(5/6), 141-156.
- McClelland, D. C. (1985). *Human motivation*. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman.
- Melé, D. m. i. e., & Sánchez-Runde, C. (2013). Cultural diversity and universal ethics in a global world. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 116(4), 681-687. doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1814-z
- Meriam-Webster. (2012). Definition of mercy. *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*. Retrieved December 1, 2012, 2012, from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mercy?show=0&t=1354391604>
- Merriam-Webster. (2012). Definition of pogrom. *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*. Retrieved November 30, 2012, from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pogrom>
- Moloney, S. (2011). Focus groups as transformative spiritual encounters. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 10(1), 58-72.
- Obama, B. (2009). President Barack Obama's inaugural address (2009). Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/>
- Porton, G. G. (2012). Judaism and Christianity: After the Holocaust. Retrieved November 27, 2012, from http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beliefs/Issues/Jews_and_Non-Jews/Attitudes_Toward_Non-Jews/Christianity/After_the_Holocaust.shtml
- Price, A. W. (1989). *Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Purpel, D. E. (2008). What matters (Vol. 12, pp. 115-128): Kuyers Institute for Christian Teaching & Learning.
- Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton university press.
- Rashkover, R. (2000). Jewish responses to Jewish-Christian dialogue: A look ahead to the Twenty-First Century. *Cross Currents*, 50(1/2), 211.

- The reasons for my involvement in the Peace Movement. (2001, September 8, 2001). Retrieved December 11, 2013, from <https://theshalomcenter.org/node/61>
- Reece, S. D. (2012). *Mercy: The power of remembering, restoring, and reconciling*. Paper presented at the The Global Conversation Lecture Series, New Delhi, India.
- Salzborn, S., Brosig, B., & Schmidt, P. (2011). Antisemitism research using methodological triangulation: A case study in Germany. *Quality & Quantity*, 45(6), 1201-1215. doi: 10.1007/s11135-009-9286-z
- Schlösser, O., Frese, M., Heintze, A.-M., Al-Najjar, M., Arciszewski, T., Besevegis, E., . . . Zhang, K. (2013). Humane orientation as a new cultural dimension of the GLOBE project: A validation study of the GLOBE scale and out-group humane orientation in 25 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 44(4), 535-551. doi: 10.1177/0022022112465671
- Shady, S. L. H., & Larson, M. (2010). Tolerance, empathy, or inclusion? Insights from Martin Buber. *Educational Theory*, 60(1), 81-96. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.2010.00347.x
- Sharpe, L. (2006). Swimming in the grey zones - locating the other spaces in mobile art. *Leonardo Electronic Almanac*, 14(3/4), 21-21.
- Sienna, B. (2006). Acts of lovingkindness bring Torah into the world. *Shavuot for June 3, 2006*. Retrieved November 12, 2010, from <http://www.kolel.org/pages/5766/shavuot.html>
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LyJqSX2Y8a8J:www.kolel.org/pages/5766/shavuot.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>
- Steinman, L. (2013). *The crooked mirror: A memoir of Polish-Jewish reconciliation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Stenger, V. J. (2006). Do our values come from God? The evidence says no. *Free Inquiry*, 26(5), 42-45.
- Sulek, A. (2012). Ordinary Poles look at the Jews. *East European Politics & Societies*, 26(2), 425-444. doi: 10.1177/0888325411415402
- Telushkin, J. (1994). *Jewish wisdom: Ethical, spiritual and historical lessons from the great works and thinkers*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Telushkin, J. (2001). *Jewish literacy: The most important things to know about the Jewish religion, its people and its history* (Revised ed.). New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Telushkin, J. (2006). *A Jewish code of ethics: You shall be holy* (1 ed. Vol. 1). New York: Bell Tower (Crown Publishing Group).
- Telushkin, J. (2009). *A code of Jewish ethics: Love your neighbor as yourself* (Vol. 2). New York: Bell Tower (Crown Publishing Company).

- Tippett, K. (2007). *Speaking of faith: Why religion matters -- and how to talk about it* Retrieved from WorldCat database Retrieved from <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip074/2006036074.html>
- Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism & collectivism*: Westview Press.
- Tzedakah. (2012). *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*. from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzedakah>
- Volf, M. (2000). The social meaning of reconciliation. *Interpretation*, 54(2), 158-172.
- Waller, J. E. (2007). Deliver us from evil: Genocide and the Christian world. *Journal of Religion & Society*, 2.
- Weiman, R. (2008). The power of hope. *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 43(2), 87-96.
- Wolf, T. (2010a). *Lifecode: An examination of the shape, the nature, and the usage of the oikoscodes, a replicative nonformal learning pattern of ethical education for leadership and community groups*.
- Wolf, T. (2010b). Social change and development: A research template (pp. 18). New Delhi, India: University Institute.
- Wyschogrod, M. (1986, January 28). Orthodox Judaism and Jewish-Christian dialogue. *Mid-winter conference of the Rabbinical Council of America*. Retrieved December 8, 2013, from http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/solwyscho.htm
- Yousif, Y., & Korte, C. (1995). Urbanization, culture, and helpfulness: Cross-cultural studies in England and the Sudan. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 26(5), 474-489. doi: 10.1177/0022022195265002
- Zimmerman, J. D. (2003a). *Contested memories Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and its aftermath*: Rutgers University Press.
- Zimmerman, J. D. (2003b). Introduction: Changing perceptions in the historiography of Polish-Jewish relations during the Second World War. In J. D. Zimmerman (Ed.), *Contested memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and its aftermath* (pp. 348). New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.